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PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS: 
ONLINE ACCESS AND THE LOSS OF 
PRACTICAL  OBSCURITY 
David S. Ardia* 
 
Court records present a conundrum for privacy advocates. Pub- 
lic access to the courts has long been a fundamental tenant of Ameri- 
can democracy, helping to ensure that our system of justice functions 
fairly and that citizens can observe the actions of their government. 
Yet court records contain an astonishing amount of private and sensi- 
tive information, ranging from  social security numbers to the names 
of sexual assault victims. Until recently, the privacy harms that at- 
tended the public disclosure of court records were generally regarded 
as insignificant because court files were difficult to search and access. 
But this “practical obscurity” is rapidly disappearing as the courts 
move from the paper-based world of the twentieth century to an inter- 
connected, electronic world where physical and temporal barriers to 
information are eroding. 
These changes are prompting courts—and increasingly, legisla- 
tures—to reexamine public access to court records. Although this 
reexamination can be beneficial, a number of courts are abandoning 
the careful balancing of interests that has traditionally guided judges 
in access disputes and instead are excluding whole categories of in- 
formation, documents, and cases from public access. This approach, 
while superficially appealing, is contrary to established First Amend- 
ment principles that require case-specific analysis before access can be 
restricted and is putting at risk the public’s ability to observe the func- 
tioning of the courts and justice system. 
This article pushes back against the categorical exclusion of in- 
formation in court records. In doing so, it makes three core claims. 
First, the First Amendment provides a qualified right of public access 
to all court records that are material to a court’s exercise of its adjudi- 
catory power. Second, before a court can restrict public access, it must 
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engage in a case-specific evaluation of the privacy and public access 
interests at stake. Third, per se categorical restrictions on public  ac- 
cess are not permissible. 
These conclusions do not leave the courts powerless to protect 
privacy, as some scholars assert. We must discard the notion that the 
protection of privacy is exclusively the job of judges and court staff. 
Instead, we need to shift the responsibility for protecting privacy to 
lawyers and litigants, who should not be permitted to include highly 
sensitive information in court files if it is not relevant to the case. Of 
course, we cannot eliminate all private and sensitive information from 
court records, but as long as courts continue to provide physical ac- 
cess to their records, the First Amendment does not preclude court 
administrators from managing electronic access in order to retain 
some of the beneficial aspects of practical obscurity. By minimizing 
the inclusion of unnecessary personal information in court files and  
by limiting the extent of electronic access to certain types of highly 
sensitive information, we can protect privacy while at the same time 
ensuring transparency and public accountability. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Court records present a conundrum for privacy advocates. Public 
access to the courts has long been a fundamental tenant of American 
democracy, helping to ensure that our system of justice functions fairly 
and that citizens can observe the actions of their government. Yet court 
records contain an astonishing amount of private and sensitive infor- 
mation, ranging from social security numbers to the names of sexual as- 
sault victims.1 Given that “[t]he courts are a stage where many of life’s 
dramas are performed, where people may be shamed, vindicated, com- 
pensated, punished, judged, or exposed,”2 it should come as no surprise 
that court records, which serve as a chronicle of these dramas, are lit- 
tered with private and sensitive information about the litigants, witness- 
es, jurors, and others who come voluntarily or involuntarily into contact 
with the court system. 
Until recently, the privacy harms associated with court records were 
generally regarded as insignificant because court files were difficult to 
search and access. In the language of privacy scholars, the information in 
court files was “practically obscure” in the sense that private and sensi- 
tive information could appear in what were ostensibly “public” records 
without creating a significant risk of actual widespread public disclosure 
or harm.3 The need to travel to the courthouse, identify the relevant case, 
locate the specific record, and copy the material made the information in 
court records difficult to access and share with others. But this obscurity 
is rapidly diminishing as courts adopt online record systems that allow 
the public to search and download records without ever having to set 
foot in a courthouse. 
As a result, court records that would have drawn little scrutiny in 
the past can now spread like wildfire across social media and the Inter- 
net’s many discussion forums. For example, when a former saleswoman 
at the real estate company Zillow sued the company for sexual harass- 
ment and wrongful termination, her complaint, which described sexually 
charged messages from male colleagues, drew hundreds of thousands of 
readers.4 And it is not just lurid sexual details that can catch the public’s 
attention and cause embarrassment; “[i]ntimate, often painful allegations 
 
1. See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical Study, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1825–27, 1881–90 (2015) (discussing the wide range of privacy interests 
that are implicated by public access to courts records). 
2. Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court 
Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 774 (2012). 
3. “Practical obscurity” refers to the idea that even information that is publicly available can 
still have private attributes if it is difficult to access, find, or contextualize. See Woodrow Hartzog & 
Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 21 (2013). 
4. See Jodi Kantor, Lawsuits’ Lurid Details Draw an Online Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2015, 
at A1. 
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in lawsuits—intended for the scrutiny of judges and juries—are increas- 
ingly drawing in mass online audiences far from the courthouses where 
they are filed.”5 
Moreover, the wealth of information in court records has not es- 
caped the attention of commercial entities that aggregate and consolidate 
information from governmental and private sources.6 Data aggregators 
such as Acxiom, ChoicePoint, LexisNexis, and the national credit bu- 
reaus routinely mine court records for personally identifiable infor- 
mation they then incorporate with other data sources to create detailed 
dossiers on almost every American.7 While much of the information in 
court records may seem innocuous in isolation, when it is combined with 
other publicly available data, the resulting intrusions into privacy can be 
significant.8 
The ease with which court records can now be accessed and dissem- 
inated online is prompting courts to reconsider their public accessibility. 
Although this reexamination can be valuable, a number of courts are 
moving away from the careful balancing of interests that has traditionally 
guided judges and instead are excluding whole categories of information, 
documents, and cases from public access. This approach, while superfi- 
cially appealing, is contrary to established First Amendment doctrines 
that require case-specific analysis before access to the courts can be re- 
stricted.9 Moreover, the increasing use of categorical exemptions is put- 
ting at risk the public’s ability to observe the functioning of the courts 
and the justice system. 
This Article pushes back against the categorical exclusion of infor- 
mation in court records. In doing so, it makes three core claims. First, the 
First Amendment provides a qualified right of access to all court records 
that are material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power.10 Second, 
before a court can restrict public access to court records, it must engage 
in a case-specific examination of the privacy and public access interests at 
 
 
5. Id.; see also Marc Davis, Do You Want Your Divorce on the Web?; Lawyers Debate How 
Much Info Should Be Aired, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 9, 1997, at J1; Todd Wallack, Court Access De- 
bate Persists, BOS. GLOBE (June 15, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/14/after-many- 
closed-door-meetings-massachusetts-courts-ask-for-public-view-public-records/6zUlSQ67IRbJvIlT 
hrlOgN/story.html. 
6. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY § IV (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call- 
transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf 
(describing a growing industry that combines public records, information on the web, and proprietary 
data). For more on the role of data aggregators, see infra notes 28–35 and accompanying text. 
7. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for A Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-  
C.L. L. REV. 435, 457 (2008). 
8. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1185 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Access and Aggregation] (“Viewed in isolation, 
each piece of our day-to-day information is not all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to 
paint a portrait about our personalities.”). 
9. See David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835, 
915–16 (2017) [hereinafter Ardia, Court Transparency]. 
10. This argument builds on my prior work on court transparency. See generally id. 
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stake. Third, the First Amendment does not permit per se categorical re- 
strictions on public access. 
Recognizing a constitutional right of access to court records does 
not leave the courts powerless to protect privacy. Courts can significantly 
reduce the amount of privacy-harming information in their records by 
shifting the responsibility for protecting private information to lawyers 
and litigants, who should not be permitted to include highly sensitive in- 
formation in court files if it is not relevant to the case. In addition, as 
long as they continue to provide physical access to their records, the First 
Amendment does not preclude courts from managing electronic access 
to retain some of the beneficial aspects of practical obscurity. 
Part II situates the discussion of public access to court records with- 
in the overall debate about privacy and government records. As privacy 
advocates have long lamented, government records contain a significant 
amount of private and sensitive information. Part II highlights two relat- 
ed developments that are forcing a reexamination of many of our as- 
sumptions about the proper balance between privacy and public infor- 
mation. First, the online availability of government records is making the 
information in them less obscure. Second, commercial data aggregators 
are increasingly mining these records for personally identifiable infor- 
mation and then applying big data tools and techniques to create com- 
prehensive profiles about individuals. 
Part III explains why court transparency is important and describes 
the source and scope of the public’s right of access to court records. Part 
IV then explores how courts—and to a growing extent, legislatures—are 
attempting to resolve the tension between privacy and court transparen- 
cy. Like other First Amendment rights, the right of access to court rec- 
ords is not absolute. Courts can restrict public access when the interests 
supporting secrecy warrant it, but the standards for doing so are quite 
high. Although scholars have long debated whether the public should 
have a right of access to court records and whether privacy interests 
ought to receive greater protection, few have addressed the specifics of 
how a First Amendment right of access should be implemented,11 and 
none have done so comprehensively. Part IV fills this gap in the scholar- 
ship by answering three essential questions courts cannot avoid when 
considering public access claims: Who has a right to access court rec- 
ords?; What records does the public have a right to access?; And how 
must the courts provide access? 
Part V concludes by taking on the widely held belief that the com- 
peting interests of court transparency and privacy are irreconcilable, of- 
fering some preliminary thoughts on how the courts can reconcile court 
access and privacy by moving beyond this “zero-sum” thinking. Several 
 
11. Scholars who have done so include Conley et al., supra note 2; Lynn M. LoPucki, Court- 
System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481 (2009); Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records— 
from Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855 (2008); and Peter A. Winn, 
Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an  Age  of  Electronic  Infor-  
mation, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307 (2004). 
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solutions are possible. First, courts should reduce the amount of privacy- 
harming information that ends up in their files in the first place, much of 
which is unnecessary to the adjudication of the underlying claims. Sec- 
ond, courts should pay careful attention to how they design their online 
access systems so the values of both public access and privacy are maxim- 
ized. Finally, as an institution, the courts should play a much more active 
role in studying the threats to privacy that court records present, as well 
as the impact that limiting online access will have on court transparency. 
 
II. PRIVACY  AND PUBLIC RECORDS 
It is no secret that the government maintains records about us. It 
could not function without doing so. Many people would be shocked, 
however, to know how extensive these records are and how readily gov- 
ernmental entities share the information they collect with others. While 
the government has long kept detailed information on its citizens, the 
adoption of electronic record systems and the explosion of commercial 
entities that collect, aggregate, and sell public records is forcing a reex- 
amination of the impact that public records have on privacy. 
Governments at all levels collect and maintain a wide variety of 
records about their citizens. For example, everyone who is born in the 
United States is issued a birth certificate, which includes his or her name, 
date of birth, place of birth, parents’ names and ages, and mother’s 
maiden name, among other information.12 The government continues to 
collect additional information about us at many of the most important 
milestones in our lives. Marriage records typically contain our full name, 
former names, date and place of birth, gender, and home address.13 Di- 
vorce records contain similar details, coupled in many cases with highly 
personal information about the parties’ conduct during the marriage.14 
Voting records list our political party affiliation, date of birth, place of 
birth, home address, telephone number, and sometimes even our social 
security number.15 Property records contain descriptions of homes we 
own, including the address, size of the house, number of bedrooms and 
bathrooms, and the home’s value.16 
 
12. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102425 (West 2016) (requiring child’s name, sex, 
and birthdate and parents’ names and birthplaces to be provided on birth certificates); see also 10A 
N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41H.0601 (2016) (same). 
13. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 351 (West 2016) (requiring birth names, mailing addresses, and 
birthdates); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-8 (2016) (requiring social security numbers). 
14. See Nancy S. Marder, From “Practical Obscurity” to Web  Disclosure:  A New  Understanding  
of Public Information, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 446 (2009) (“Divorce cases can produce information 
about assets, infidelities, and child custody disputes.”). 
15. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.4 (requiring name, date of birth, address, gender, race, 
party affiliation, telephone number, and driver’s license number or last four digits of social security 
number); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2., § 19055 (2016) (requiring birthdate, birth place, current address, 
occupation, and political party for registration and requesting social security and telephone numbers). 
16. See, e.g., CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 408.3 (West 2016) (making “property characteristics” 
including “the year of construction of improvements to the property, their square footage, the number 
of bedrooms and bathrooms of all dwellings, the property’s acreage, and other attributes of or ameni- 
ties to the property, such as swimming pools, views, zoning classifications or restrictions, use code des- 
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For those individuals who are unlucky enough to come into contact 
with law enforcement or the legal system, the number of government 
records expands significantly. Arrest records typically include one’s 
name, photograph, occupation, physical description, fingerprints, date of 
birth, and the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest.17 Police rec- 
ords also contain information about the victims of crimes, including their 
home and work addresses, medical conditions, and occupational infor- 
mation.18 If a criminal or civil matter ends up in court, the depth of intru- 
sion into personal matters can seem endless. Court records contain eve- 
rything from bank account numbers to psychological evaluations.19 And 
it is not just the parties in litigation who need to worry about the pres- 
ence of personal information in a court’s files. Sensitive information 
about witnesses, jurors, and other third parties often appears in court 
documents.20 
For the most part, the records described above are open to public 
inspection at county and municipal offices, local courthouses, police de- 
partments, and other government offices. Statutes such as the federal 
Freedom of Information Act and state public records laws,21 as well as 
state and federal common law and the First Amendment,22 provide the 
public with access to many of these records.23 Indeed, access to govern- 
ment records is considered to be essential for the public to participate in 
and contribute to our republican system of self-government.24 As James 
Madison once warned, “popular government without popular infor- 
mation, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce, or a 
tragedy, or perhaps both.”25 
Transparency, however, has costs. Like the rest of society, govern- 
ment is in the midst of a transformation from a largely paper-based world 
 
ignations, and the number of dwelling units of multiple family properties” public); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 105-319 (listing owner’s name and values of properties along with other information from Depart- 
ment of Revenue prescribed assessments). 
17. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(1) (West 2016) (mandating that the police make public 
the name, occupation, physical description, charges, and circumstances of all arrests made); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 132-1.4(c)(2) (making information of arrests public, including “[t]he name, sex, age, address, 
employment, and alleged violation of law of a person arrested, charged, or indicted”). 
18. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(2) (making the name and age of reported victims pub- 
lic); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4(c)(6) (making “[t]he name, sex, age, and address” of an alleged victim 
public). 
19. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1, at 1828–50 (identifying 140 types of private and sensi- 
tive information that can appear in court records). 
20. See id. 
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). The federal Freedom of Information Act is known as “FOIA.” 
Every state has an open records law, many of which are modeled on FOIA. See, e.g., Public Records 
Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6250–6277; Public Records Law, N.C. Gᴇɴ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 132-1 to -11. 
22. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 847–50. 
23. As early as 1641, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, the first legal code in New England, 
provided a right of access to government records. See MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES, art. 48 (1641) 
(“Every inhabitant of the Country shall have free liberty to search and view any Roles, Records or 
Registers of any Court or office . . . .”). 
24. See infra Part III. 
25. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON (Gaillard Hunt ed. 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 
1392 UNIVERSITY OF  ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2017 
 
to an interconnected electronic world where physical and temporal bar- 
riers to information are eroding. As a result of this transformation, a 
growing proportion of government records can now be searched, 
browsed, and downloaded online without the cost and hassle that typical- 
ly accompany access to paper records.26 Not surprisingly, as accessing and 
sharing government records becomes easier, the risks to privacy increase 
as well. 
Discussions of government transparency often conjure the image of 
the well-meaning civic gadfly who keeps tabs on the government by scru- 
tinizing government reports and budget documents.27 Yet the primary us- 
ers of most government records are commercial entities commonly 
known as “data brokers” that aggregate and consolidate information 
from governmental and private sources, which they then sell to other pri- 
vate parties—and in some cases back to the government.28 By combining 
the information found in government records with consumer purchase 
data, web browsing activities, warranty registrations, and other details of 
consumers’ everyday actions, these data aggregators are able to create 
highly detailed summaries of nearly every person.29 
As other scholars have documented, the aggregation and sale of this 
information is very big business.30 Daniel Solove’s work on the aggrega- 
tion of public records has been particularly illuminating. According to 
Solove, we have “a system where the government extracts personal in- 
formation from the populace and places it in the public domain, where it 
is hoarded by private sector corporations that assemble dossiers on al- 
most every American citizen.”31 The end result, Solove concludes, is a 
“growing dehumanization, powerlessness, and vulnerability for individu- 
als.”32 
Commercial data aggregators are also increasingly applying “big da- 
ta” tools and techniques to profile individuals and to predict and influ- 
ence their behavior.33 With enormous data sets, inexpensive storage, and 
vast computing power, data aggregators and their clients can analyze bil- 
 
26. See Micah Altman et al., Towards A Modern Approach to Privacy-Aware Government Data 
Releases, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1967, 1987 (2015) (describing the various ways that governments 
release information). 
27. See Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 66 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1364 (2016). 
28. See, e.g., id. at 1361 (describing the corporate use of FOIA, including “a cottage industry of 
companies whose entire business model is to request federal records under FOIA and resell them at a 
profit”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6. 
29. According to the Federal Trade Commission, data brokers collect and store billions of data 
elements covering nearly every U.S. consumer. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 46–47. 
30. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 7; Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How Choice- 
Point and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMMERCIAL REG. 595, 596 (2004); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Da- 
ta Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 404 (2014); Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 
1149. 
31. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1142. 
32.   Id. at 1141. 
33. See Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data Threatens 
Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 69 (2013); Richards & King, supra note 30, at 397– 
405. 
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lions of disparate pieces of information to identify previously hidden pat- 
terns.34 As Neil Richards and Jonathan King warn, “[t]he increasing 
adoption of big data is such that all kinds of human activity, ranging from 
dating to hiring, voting, policing, and identifying terrorists, have already 
become heavily influenced by big data techniques.”35 
For years, privacy scholars have been sounding the alarm about the 
ways public records are exploited for commercial and other purposes.36 
Concern is only increasing, however, as more and more government rec- 
ords are going online, raising the risk of identity theft, stalking, domestic 
violence, and other safety issues. In fact, individuals can now do the kind 
of matching of public records that was traditionally performed only by 
large data aggregators. A group of students at Johns Hopkins University, 
for example, replicated the methods of companies like ChoicePoint by 
downloading and linking public record databases containing death rec- 
ords, property tax information, campaign donations, and occupational 
license registries.37 The researchers were then able to search by name on- 
ly and discover an individual’s date of birth, home address, phone num- 
ber, occupation, political party registration, voting history, and spouse’s 
name and the price they paid for their home.38 
One of the challenges the law faces in addressing privacy concerns 
that arise from public access to government records is the deeply en- 
trenched view that privacy is dichotomous: information is either public or 
private, but it cannot be both.39 Under this view, because government 
records are ostensibly “public,” there can be no claim to privacy when 
the information in government records is widely shared or combined 
with other information.40 A number of privacy scholars have strongly 
pushed back against this binary approach to privacy, arguing that it “fails 
to account for the realities of the Information Age, where information is 
rarely completely confidential.”41 Given the extent of the information 
 
34. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html (“[A member of Target’s 
data analytics team identified] about 25 products that, when analyzed together, allowed him to assign 
each shopper a ‘pregnancy prediction’ score. More important, he could also estimate her due date to 
within a small window, so Target could send coupons timed to very specific stages of her pregnancy.”). 
35. Richards & King, supra note 30, at 405. 
36. See, e.g., Grayson Barber, Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the Pub-    
lic Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 63, 65 (2006); Hoofnagle, supra note 30, at 596–97; 
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL. 
559, 561, 577 (1998); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1958–59 
(2013); Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1142. 
37. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Personal Data for the Taking, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2005), http:// 
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01EFD91639F93BA25756C0A9639C8B63&pagewanted 
=all (describing the work of graduate students in a computer security course at Johns Hopkins Univer- 
sity). 
38. Id. 
39. See Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 13–20; Nissenbaum, supra note 36, at 559 n.2. 
40. See Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1140 (arguing for the rejection of the 
“longstanding notion that there is no claim to privacy when information appears in a public record”). 
41. Id. at 1140–41; accord Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 20 (“The public/private dichot- 
omy in the law is flawed because it relies on largely arbitrary distinctions that fail to reflect Internet 
users’ notions of privacy.”). 
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that we share with the government and private entities, privacy scholars 
warn that “clinging to the notion of privacy as [requiring] total secrecy 
would mean the practical extinction of privacy in today’s world.”42 
What Daniel Solove and other privacy-law scholars argue is that the 
label of “public” or “private” should not be determinative. Two scholars 
in particular have been especially influential in pushing for a reconsidera- 
tion of the public/private dichotomy that exists in much of privacy law. 
The first is Helen Nissenbaum, who has developed a framework for eval- 
uating privacy called “contextual integrity,” based on the central tenet 
that privacy must be judged on a continuum.43 For Nissenbaum, privacy 
has been violated whenever there is a breach of contextual integrity, i.e., 
whenever the norms of appropriate use or flow of information have been 
transgressed.44 
Extending Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity, Woodrow 
Hartzog argues that “[t]he concept of obscurity can play a key role in ad- 
dressing the issues that the secrecy paradigm overlooks.”45 According to 
Hartzog, obscurity captures the notion that “when information is hard to 
obtain or understand, it is, to some degree, safe.”46 Hartzog concludes 
that accounting for the obscurity of information, “could help courts and 
lawmakers determine if information is eligible for privacy protections.”47 
As discussed in the next Section, obscurity has long been recognized as 
serving a privacy-enhancing function in protecting sensitive information 
in public records,48 but its conceptual force is especially applicable to 
court records. 
 
 
 
 
 
42. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1152 (2002). 
43. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 137 (2004) 
(“[T]here are no arenas of life not governed by norms of information flow, no information or spheres 
of life for which ‘anything goes.’”). For Nissenbaum, the idea that information labeled as “public” is 
categorically undeserving of privacy protection is belied by the fact that “[a]lmost everything—things 
that we do, events that occur, transactions that take place—happens in a context not only of place but 
of politics, convention, and cultural expectation.” Id. 
44. Id. at 138 (“[I]n any given situation, a complaint that privacy has been violated is sound in 
the event that . . . norms [of appropriateness or the flow of information have] been transgressed.”). 
45. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1343, 1358 (2015). 
46. Id. 
47. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 2. In the context of online communication, Hartzog 
and his co-author Fredric Stutzman assert that obscurity can be said to exist when at least one of four 
“key factors” that play an essential role in the discovery or comprehension of information is missing: 
“(1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity.” Id. We will return to 
the relevance of these factors to online court records in Part V. 
48. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 
780 (1989) (noting the “practical obscurity of rap-sheet information” and concluding that the compila- 
tion of these publicly accessible law enforcement records can raise privacy concerns under FOIA); 
Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 968 A.2d 1151, 1164 (N.J. 2009) (“[B]ulk disclosure of realty records to a 
company planning to include them in a searchable, electronic database would eliminate the practical 
obscurity that now envelops those records at the Bergen County Clerk’s Office.”). 
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A. Sensitive Information in Court  Records 
Although privacy concerns can arise whenever the government 
shares the information it collects about individuals, privacy risks are par- 
ticularly acute in the context of court records, which contain some of our 
most intimate and sensitive information. A court’s file for a single case 
may consist of thousands of records, including motions, pleadings, briefs, 
transcripts, exhibits entered into evidence, and documents produced dur- 
ing pre-trial discovery such as medical records, credit reports, and tax re- 
turns that have been filed with the court.49 Each of these records can con- 
tain personal information about the parties and other individuals, 
including dates of birth, home addresses, places of employment, medical 
conditions, sexual histories, and social security numbers.50 
In a study examining the extent of private and sensitive information 
in the briefs and appendices submitted to the North Carolina Supreme 
Court from 1984 to 2000, Anne Klinefelter and I found that these records 
contained an average of 113 appearances of sensitive information per 
document.51 The most frequently occurring types of sensitive information 
we found in the documents were related to a person’s location, identity, 
criminal history, health, and finances.52 We also found that criminal in- 
formation, such as crime victim names, criminal charges, and the names 
of subjects under investigation, is particularly pervasive in court records53 
and warned that “[t]he combination of online and data broker exposure 
of often stale and incomplete arrest and conviction information [can cre- 
ate] long-term barriers to fresh starts including negative impacts on ‘em- 
ployment and housing prospects, parental rights, educational opportuni- 
ties, freedom of movement, and just about every other aspect of daily 
life.’”54 
Although some of this information may appear innocuous by itself, 
when it is linked to other publicly available information, such as voting, 
phone, and property records, the potential harm to privacy increases 
exponentially.55 Daniel Solove calls this the “aggregation problem”: 
Viewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day information is not 
all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait 
about our personalities. The aggregation problem arises from the 
 
49. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 781. 
50. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1, at 1838–51 (identifying 140 types of private and sensi- 
tive information that can appear in court records). 
51. See id. at 1857–59. We found that sensitive information, however, was not uniformly distrib- 
uted throughout the records; most documents contained fewer than forty pieces of sensitive infor- 
mation, while a handful of documents contained more than 1,000 pieces. See id. at 1858. Our study 
used a stratified random sample by year of documents pulled from 12,137 briefs and other filings from 
the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 1851. In total, we analyzed 504 documents containing 24,156 
pages drawn from 466 cases. See id. at 1851, 1853. 
52.   Id. at 1861. 
53.  Id. at 1883–84. 
54. Id. at 1841 (quoting Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 
2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 327 (2015)). 
55. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 782; Marder, supra note 14, at 447. 
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fact that the digital revolution has enabled information to be easily 
amassed and combined. Even information in public records that is 
superficial or incomplete can be quite useful in obtaining more data 
about individuals. Information breeds information. For example, 
although one’s social security number does not in and of itself re- 
veal much about an individual, it provides access to one’s financial 
information, educational records, medical records, and a whole host 
of other information.56 
And it is not just the litigants whose privacy interests may be impli- 
cated by information in a court’s files. In fact, a great deal of sensitive in- 
formation associated with nonparties ends up in court records because 
these individuals typically have no one advocating to protect their priva- 
cy.57 This includes witnesses and other individuals who come into contact 
with one of the parties or who are otherwise brought into the resolution 
of a case.58 In fact, even jurors must worry about their privacy, as court 
records often contain their names, addresses, occupations, and places of 
employment, as well as their answers to highly personal voir dire ques- 
tions.59 
 
B. The Diminishing Role of Practical Obscurity 
Although concerns about the public disclosure of sensitive infor- 
mation in court records existed long before the Internet, many privacy 
scholars see the move to electronic court records as effectuating a quali- 
tative shift in the risks that public access portends.60 While court records 
have long been open to public inspection, the difficulty of actually access- 
ing individual documents made the information in these records practi- 
cally obscure. Over the past decade, however, courts across the country 
have been moving to make their records available online, and many 
courts require litigants to file their pleadings, motions, and other docu- 
ments in electronic format.61 As a result, it now takes little effort to find 
and link information across cases, courts, and states. 
In 2012, several computer scientists and a lawyer led by renowned 
privacy scholar Helen Nissenbaum published an empirical study that ex- 
amined how the shift from paper-based, locally-accessible court records 
to online access is impacting the disclosure of personal information con- 
 
56. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1185. 
57. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 781. 
58. Id. 
59. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. SAMPLE FORM 56, http://judicial.alabama.gov/library/rules/ 
crsam56.pdf (providing a Uniform Juror Questionnaire containing forty-eight questions plus six op- 
tional questions addressing such matters as jurors’ affiliations, hobbies, reading and viewing practices, 
and opinions). 
60. See, e.g., Conley et al., supra note 2, at 808; Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 16–20; Mar- 
tin, supra note 11, at 869–70; Winn, supra note 11, at 314–18. 
61. See Martin, supra note 11, at 872 (“By the end of 2007, electronic filing was an option in 
nearly all federal trial courts and was mandatory in a large number . . . .”); John T. Matthias, E-Filing 
Expansion in State, Local, and Federal Courts 2007, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2007, at 34, 
34 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2007) (reporting that, as of 2007, twenty-six states had adopted court 
rules enabling e-filing statewide or in at least one court). 
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tained in court records.62 After visiting a number of state courthouses, the 
researchers found that they had to commit significant time and effort to 
locate and access the physical records they sought.63 For example, to ac- 
cess paper records at a New Jersey courthouse, they had to travel to the 
courthouse, pass through courthouse security, and find the appropriate 
case in the court’s case index.64 They then had to provide the case’s dock- 
et number to a clerk, who retrieved the document and made a copy, but 
only after they paid the copying fee at a separate “fee station.”65 As the 
researchers noted, accessing court records in this fashion “was time- 
consuming” and necessitated “interact[ing] with clerks at every step.”66 
Moreover, they could not search for records across multiple courthouses 
and found that “it was difficult to access records for which we did not 
know exactly what we were looking.”67 
With the move to online court records, these impediments to access 
are vanishing. Although the specifics of electronic access vary by state 
(and sometimes by court), in all federal courts and in many state courts 
that provide online access, the public can access a court’s electronic case 
database through a website interface. That interface typically provides 
the ability to search by party names, case type, keywords, and other in- 
formation and typically also provides case-by-case browsing. If users wish 
to copy a document, they can usually do so by downloading it directly to 
their computer as a PDF file. 
The United States federal courts were the first to implement elec- 
tronic access to case information, doing so in 1990.68 The current system 
in use in the federal courts, known as Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records (“PACER”), allows for public online access to all federal dis- 
trict courts, bankruptcy courts, and appellate courts.69 PACER’s Case 
Locator permits users of the system to search by party name or social se- 
curity number depending on the type of case; the search will return the 
names of the parties, the court where the case is filed, the case number, 
the date filed, and the date closed.70 A user can filter results by court type 
(e.g., civil, criminal, appellate), court name (e.g., Southern District of 
New York or Eastern District of North Carolina), year in which the case 
 
62. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 808–14 (describing their study). 
63.  Id. at 820–21. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 818–19. They were charged $.75 per page at a New Jersey courthouse but noted that 
New Jersey’s Superior Court website listed a lower fee. Id. at 819. 
66.   Id. at 820. 
67.   Id. at 822. 
68. See Martin, supra note 11, at 860, 872. 
69. PACER works in conjunction with the Case Management/Electronic Case Files 
(“CM/ECF”) system, which was implemented in the bankruptcy courts in 2001, the federal district 
courts in 2002, and the appellate courts in 2004. FAQs: Case Management/Electronic Case Files 
(CM/ECF), U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtrecords/electronic-filing-cmecf/faqs-case- 
management-electronic-case-files-cmecf (last visited June 20, 2017). 
70. See Frequently Asked Questions, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/psc/faq.html (click “How 
can I search a PACER database?”). In order to access the search interface or to download documents, 
a user has to register with PACER by providing a name, address, and credit card number. Id. 
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was filed, nature of suit (e.g., contract, antitrust, civil rights), or case title. 
A user can also browse records based on the nature of the suit, look at all 
cases that have been filed or decided within a certain time period, and 
download copies of filed documents through the Case Manage- 
ment/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system, which charges $.10 per 
page.71 Although PACER provides access only to the federal courts, a 
number of state courts have similar electronic filing and retrieval sys- 
tems, and many more will be implementing such systems over the next 
decade.72 
Not surprisingly, when Nissenbaum and her team compared online 
access with physical access at the courthouse, they concluded that “there 
are significant differences in the cost of retrieving various types of per- 
sonal information about a data subject” and that these differences have 
an impact on the patterns of information flow.73 Indeed, it is important to 
recognize that electronic record systems are not simply an additional 
means of public access to court records, akin to an online clerk’s office 
where hardcopy equivalents can be requested and copied more easily. 
Electronic court record systems provide much more than that. They spur 
uses of court records that were previously difficult, or in some cases im- 
possible, to accomplish. In the paper-based world of court records, one 
had to know the case number in order to access a court record at the 
clerk’s office. With electronic court records, the information in a court’s 
files can be searched, sorted, and combined with other information with- 
out any need to maintain the record’s connection to a specific case. In 
other words, users of the information need not know anything about the 
underlying case or even that the information came from a court record. 
The information simply becomes another piece of de-contextualized data 
that can be put to almost any use. As Peter Martin has noted, “[t]his al- 
lows inspection of litigation records along lines and from vantage points 
that were previously blocked.”74 
The adoption of electronic record systems is also eliminating the ef- 
fects of the passage of time on the accessibility of court records, which 
typically would become more obscure over time. Paper records are costly 
to maintain and court clerks inevitably face difficult choices regarding 
the preservation of closed case files. The lifecycle for a court record typi- 
cally involves increasing levels of obscurity as the record moves from a 
court’s active files to the clerk’s archives and eventually to long-term 
storage or destruction.75 Electronic court records are rarely subject to this 
 
71. Id. Users are only charged a maximum of $3 per document. Id. 
72. This is not to say that PACER is without its critics. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 11, at 486– 
88 (cataloging the many problems that researchers face when using PACER); Letter from Carl Mal- 
amud, President, Public.Resource.Org, to Mr. Robert Lowney, Chief, Programs Div., Admin. Office 
of the U.S. Courts (Mar. 31, 2015) [hereinafter Malamud Letter to Mr. Lowney], https://law.resource. 
org/pacer/pacer.uscourts.gov.20150331.pdf (criticizing what he sees as the “collection of excessive rev- 
enues in a manner contrary to law by the Administrative Office in significant amounts”). 
73. Conley et al., supra note 2, at 814. 
74. Martin, supra note 11, at 885. 
75.  See id. at 869–70. 
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temporal degradation in access. As a result, records from cases that con- 
clude today will remain just as accessible a decade from now. 
Furthermore, the heaviest users of electronic court records have 
been commercial entities, particularly data brokers and other infor- 
mation resellers, who benefit tremendously from the economies of scale 
electronic-record systems offer.76 Peter Martin, who has examined the 
history of PACER, writes that this is not by chance: “the [PACER] sys- 
tem has unmistakably been shaped to meet the needs of this business sec- 
tor. The federal bankruptcy courts, historically a critical information 
source for the credit industry and those serving it, have been the engine 
driving the spread of remote access, digital case records and electronic 
filing.”77 According to Martin, as of 2008, “[r]oughly seventy percent of 
PACER usage concern[ed] bankruptcy cases.”78 
While the courts have generally been slow to consider the implica- 
tions of technology on privacy, the Supreme Court recognized in 1989 
that when the government aggregates otherwise public information in 
computer databases, it increases the risks to privacy.79 In United States 
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee  for  Freedom  of  the  Press, 
the Court faced the question of whether the disclosure of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) criminal identification records data- 
base of “rap sheets” on over 24 million persons “could reasonably be ex- 
pected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” within 
the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).80 Concluding 
that the “privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap- 
sheet information will always be high,”81 the Court treated the aggrega- 
tion of information as central to its analysis of the degree to which priva- 
cy interests would be harmed by the disclosure of the FBI’s database: 
Recognition of this attribute of a privacy interest supports the dis- 
tinction, in terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure 
of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of 
the rap sheet as a whole. . . . [T]he issue here is whether the compi- 
lation of otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy in- 
terest implicated by disclosure of that information. Plainly there is a 
vast difference between the public records that might be found after 
a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local po- 
lice stations throughout the country and a computerized summary 
located in a single clearinghouse of information.82 
 
76. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION, 56–57 
(2001); Martin, supra note 11, at 867; Rebecca Hulse, E-Filing and Privacy, CRIM. JUST., Summer 
2009, at 14, 16. 
77. Martin, supra note 11, at 867. 
78. Id. 
79. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762–64 
(1989). 
80.   Id. at 751. 
81.   Id. at 780. 
82.   Id. at 764. 
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In light of the additional privacy risks associated with the aggrega- 
tion of rap-sheet information, the Court ultimately held that disclosure of 
the FBI database’s contents to third parties could reasonably be expected 
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy within the 
meaning of FOIA’s law-enforcement exemption and was therefore ex- 
empt from disclosure under the statute.83 It should be noted that the 
Court’s decision did not address the public’s right of access to court rec- 
ords, but rather a request for access under FOIA. The standard for de- 
termining whether public access can be denied under FOIA is less de- 
manding than the standard for restricting access to court records; all the 
government was required to show was that disclosure “could reasonably 
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”84 
Given concerns about the commercial exploitation of electronic 
court records and the increased risks to privacy, a number of courts and 
legislatures are considering—and some have begun to implement— 
substantial curtailments of public access through restrictions on certain 
users and uses of court records, redaction of electronic and print records, 
and the removal of categories of court records from public access.85 Be- 
fore we consider whether these approaches are permissible and norma- 
tively desirable, it is important to understand why open courts are im- 
portant and what benefits can flow from public access to court records. 
III. OPEN COURTS AND THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC ACCESS 
Americans have long enjoyed the most transparent court system in 
the world.86 Public access to the courts provides many benefits, including 
ensuring that our justice system functions fairly and that citizens can un- 
derstand the actions of their government.87 Public access even offers 
therapeutic value to the community, as Chief Justice Warren Burger ob- 
served in Richmond  Newspapers,  Inc. v. Virginia: 
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread ac- 
knowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, that 
public trials had significant community therapeutic value. Even 
without such experts to frame the concept in words, people sensed 
from experience and observation that, especially in the administra- 
tion of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have 
the support derived from public acceptance of both the process and 
its results.88 
Although public access to court proceedings and records is 
longstanding and deeply ingrained in the American legal system, the pre- 
cise source and contours of the public’s right of access to the courts re- 
 
83.   Id. at 780. 
84.   Id. at 756 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1982)). 
85. See infra Part IV. 
86. LoPucki, supra note 11, at 484. 
87. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (Globe Newspaper), 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982). 
88. 448 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1980). 
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main murky. The Supreme Court itself has held that the First Amend- 
ment mandates a presumption of public access only to criminal trials and 
some pre-trial proceedings.89 Nevertheless, as I argue both here and 
elsewhere,90 the Supreme Court’s rationale for recognizing a First 
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings—that public access is 
essential to self-government—applies with equal force to civil proceed- 
ings and court records. Indeed, as discussed below, many lower courts al- 
ready recognize a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings 
and court records. 
 
A. Court Transparency and the First  Amendment 
In what was considered at the time to be a “watershed case,” the 
Supreme Court held in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers that the guaran- 
tees of the First Amendment’s press and speech clauses necessitate a 
public right to attend criminal trials.91 In that case, Chief Justice Warren 
Burger acknowledged that the First Amendment does not explicitly re- 
quire public access to the courts, but he concluded nonetheless that the 
Amendment’s provisions implied that such a right exists: “[i]n guarantee- 
ing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment 
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to 
give meaning to those explicit guarantees.”92 
In a series of cases that followed Richmond Newspapers, the Court 
went on to hold that a First Amendment right of access could apply in 
other criminal contexts, including preliminary hearings and voir dire pro- 
ceedings.93 Yet the Court’s access decisions left two important questions 
unanswered: (1) whether the First Amendment’s right of access to crimi- 
nal proceedings also applies to civil proceedings; and (2) whether a right 
of access extends to the records associated with those proceedings. 
Previously, I examined the Supreme Court’s public access jurispru- 
dence and concluded that the doctrinal and theoretical bases for the 
Court’s recognition of a First Amendment right of access to criminal 
proceedings apply with equal force to civil proceedings and to court rec- 
ords.94 Judges and scholars have identified a variety of benefits that flow 
from allowing the public to observe the activities of the courts, such as: 
safeguarding the integrity of the fact-finding process;95 ensuring the fair- 
 
89. Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 919. 
90.  Id. at 889–906. 
91. 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion). In his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Jus- 
tice Stevens wrote: “This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute 
protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the 
acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever.” Id. at 582 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
92.   Id. at 575. 
93. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that 
the First Amendment provides a right of access to preliminary hearings); Press-Enterprise ), 464 U.S. 
at 510–11 (holding that a right of access to jury voir dire exists). 
94. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 910–12. 
95. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). 
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ness of judicial proceedings;96 educating the public about the implementa- 
tion and impact of the law;97 promoting public confidence in the justice 
system;98 supporting the development of the common law;99 informing the 
public about important safety and welfare issues;100 fostering discussion 
about matters of public concern;101 and providing therapeutic value to the 
community.102 
Even a cursory review of this list reveals that the benefits that flow 
from public access extend beyond criminal trials. Indeed, following its 
decision in Richmond Newspapers, the Court went on to explain in Globe 
Newspaper v. Superior Court that public access to the courts “serves to 
ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and con- 
tribute to our republican system of self-government.”103 Justice William 
Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Globe Newspaper Co., clari- 
fied why this is so: “[u]nderlying the First Amendment right of access to 
criminal trials is the common understanding that ‘a major purpose of that 
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental af- 
fairs.’”104 Brennan made a similar observation in his Richmond Newspa- 
pers concurrence, where he linked court transparency to the First 
Amendment’s “structural role” of fostering self-government: 
Implicit in this structural role is not only “the principle that debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, but the antecedent assumption  
that valuable public debate as well as other civic behavior must be 
informed. The structural model links the First Amendment to that 
process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, 
and thus entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but for 
the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication.105 
Moreover, there is no principled way to limit a First Amendment 
right of access only to criminal trials. As I have pointed out elsewhere, it 
makes little sense to base a First Amendment right of access on the bene- 
fits that public access provides to individual criminal proceedings, or 
even to the court system as a whole: “[w]hile a just and effective court 
system is undoubtedly an important public good, it is not a core First 
 
96.  See, e.g., In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1313–14 (7th Cir. 1984). 
97. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 827 (3d Cir. 1981). 
98. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508. 
99. See, e.g., Symposium, Panel Discussion Judicial Records Forum, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1735, 
1745–46 (2015). 
100. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
101. See, e.g., Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978). 
102. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1980). 
103. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940)). 
This theory of the First Amendment is most commonly associated with Alexander Meiklejohn. See 
generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 27 (1965) (discussing the importance of freedom of speech in regards to self-governance). 
104. 457 U.S. at 604–05 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). 
105. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted); see 
also William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Dedication at Newhouse Center for Law and Justice (Oct. 
17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176 (1979) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the structure of 
communications necessary for the existence of our democracy.”). 
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Amendment value. Public access takes on First Amendment significance 
because it advances the First Amendment’s structural purpose.”106 In 
other words, public access to the courts is of First Amendment signifi- 
cance because it makes informed self-government possible.107 If citizens 
are the ultimate sovereigns, as the Constitution presupposes, they must 
have access to the information necessary to evaluate the actions of their 
government.108 
Although it may be the case that public access plays a particularly 
important role in criminal cases—where a defendant’s liberty is directly 
at stake—the benefits of public access unquestionably flow from public 
access to civil cases as well.109 In fact, the public’s interest in civil proceed- 
ings is at least as great as its interest in criminal proceedings given how 
wide ranging civil litigation is.110 This is so even when the government is 
not a party. As Lee Levine has noted, civil litigation “can, and does, es- 
tablish legal rules governing social policy from medical malpractice and 
environmental hazards to dangerous products, toxic pollution, and other 
issues that impact the public health and safety.”111 
Recognizing the importance of public access to civil proceedings, 
nearly all federal appellate courts apply a First Amendment right of ac- 
cess to civil cases,112 as do many state supreme courts.113 
 
B. The First Amendment Right to Access Court Records 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly held that the First 
Amendment provides a right of access to court records, the Court’s prec- 
edents appear to recognize such a right, and many lower courts have 
concluded that a right of access to judicial records logically flows from 
 
106. Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 894. 
107.  Id. at 890–91. 
108.    Id. at 918. 
109.  Id. at 906–918. 
110. See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979) (“[I]n some civil cases the public 
interest in access, and the salutary effect of publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger than, in most 
criminal cases.”). 
111. See LEE LEVINE ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 6.01 (4th ed. 2011). 
112. See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014); Grove Fresh 
Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994); Republic of Philippines v. West- 
inghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 1991); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 
F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408, 408 n.4 (1st Cir. 
1987); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker Indus., 
Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Cont’l Ill. Secs. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th 
Cir. 1984); In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1984); Brown & William- 
son Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178–79 (6th Cir. 1983); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 
801 (11th Cir. 1983). Only the D.C. Circuit has held to the contrary. See also Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court 
has ever indicated that it would apply the Richmond Newspapers test to anything other than criminal 
judicial proceedings.”). 
113. See, e.g., Rapid City Journal v. Delaney, 804 N.W.2d 388, 395 (S.D. 2011); Assoc. Press v. 
State, 888 A.2d 1236, 1244–45 (N.H. 2005); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC–TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 
P.2d 337, 358 (Cal. 1999); New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261, 270 (N.J. 
1990); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1108 (D.C. 1988); Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, 
Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 117–18 (Fla. 1988). 
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the Court’s public access decisions.114 Moreover, as I have argued else- 
where, the First Amendment right of access would be diminished, if not 
made meaningless, if it did not extend to court records.115 
In the Supreme Court’s two Press-Enterprise cases applying a First 
Amendment right of access to pre-trial criminal proceedings, the Court 
reversed both the closure of the proceedings and the sealing of the ac- 
companying records. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“Press- 
Enterprise I”), the trial judge excluded the public from nearly all of the 
jury voir dire proceedings in a murder case and refused to release the 
transcript even after the trial ended.116 In a unanimous decision, the Su- 
preme Court held that the First Amendment right of access attaches to 
jury voir dire.117 In striking down the trial court’s closure orders, the 
Court implicitly recognized that the First Amendment right of access ex- 
tended to the transcript too: 
“Not only was there a failure to articulate findings with the requi- 
site specificity but there was also a failure to consider alternatives to 
closure and to total suppression of the transcript. The trial judge 
should seal only such parts of the transcript as necessary to preserve 
the anonymity of the individuals sought to be protected.”118 
Two years later in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“Press- 
Enterprise II”), the Court faced this issue a second time when a magis- 
trate judge excluded the public from a forty-one day preliminary hearing 
and refused to release the transcript.119 Again, the Supreme Court held 
that the First Amendment provided a right of access to the proceeding in 
question and intimated that the public had a right to access the transcript 
as well.120 In fact, in reversing the lower court’s closure orders, the Court 
seemed to see the sealing of the transcript as an additional affront to the 
public’s right of access: 
Denying the transcript of a 41-day preliminary hearing would frus- 
trate what we have characterized as the “community therapeutic 
value” of openness . . . . “The value of openness lies in the fact that 
people not actually attending trials can have confidence that stand- 
ards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone 
is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are be- 
ing followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus 
enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the ap- 
pearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the sys- 
tem.”121 
Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Press-Enterprise 
cases, all of the federal circuits that have addressed the issue of access to 
 
114. See infra notes 116–25 and accompanying text. 
115. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 916–18. 
116. 464 U.S. 501, 503–04 (1984). 
117.   Id. at 513. 
118.  Id. (emphasis added). 
119.  478 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986). 
120. Id. at 13. 
121. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508). 
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court records in criminal cases have held that the public has a First 
Amendment right of access to such records,122 as have many state su- 
preme courts.123 Most courts have extended a First Amendment right of 
access to records filed in civil proceedings as well.124 As the First Circuit 
observed, “the basis for this right is that without access to documents the 
public often would not have a ‘full understanding’ of the proceeding and 
therefore would not always be in a position to serve as an effective check 
on the system.”125 
Indeed, it makes little sense to treat court records differently from 
court proceedings under the First Amendment. The reason the Supreme 
Court recognized a First Amendment right of access to court proceedings 
in the first place is that public access facilitates “the free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”126 If the First Amendment requires a right of ac- 
cess to court proceedings to ensure that discussion about the government 
is well informed, then it logically follows that the public must also have 
 
122. See In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (extending the right of access 
to documents and “kindred materials submitted in connection with the prosecution and defense of 
criminal proceedings”); United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993) (criminal dockets); 
Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 287–88 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (plea agreements); In re Search War- 
rant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) (search warrant 
applications); N.Y. Times Co. v. Biaggi, 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (documents filed in connec- 
tion with pretrial suppression hearings); Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Presser, 828 F.2d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 
1987) (materials related to recusal motion); United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(transcripts of closed preliminary hearings); Wash. Post Co. v. Soussoudis, 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 
1986) (documents filed in connection with plea and sentencing hearings); United States v. Peters, 754 
F.2d 753, 763 (7th Cir. 1985) (trial exhibits); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(bills of particulars); Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 
(9th Cir. 1983) (documents filed in pretrial proceedings). The Tenth Circuit has avoided deciding 
whether there is a First Amendment right of access to criminal or civil court records. See Riker v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, 315 Fed. Appx. 752, 756 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Even assuming, without deciding, that 
there is a First Amendment right to court documents, that right is not absolute. . . . [A]ny interest Mr. 
Jordan has is outweighed by the safety needs of Mr. Riker.”); United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 
812 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[F]or the purposes of this opinion, we assume without deciding that access to 
judicial documents is governed by the analysis articulated in Press–Enterprise II.”). 
123. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 543 A.2d 284, 285 (Conn. 1988); Oahu Publ'ns Inc. v. Ahn, 331 P.3d 
460, 485 (Haw. 2014); Commonwealth v. Doe, 648 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Mass. 1995), abrogated by 
Commonwealth v. Pon, 14 N.E.3d 182 (Mass. 2014); In re VV Publ'g Corp., 577 A.2d 412, 417-18 (N.J. 
1990); Nichols v. Jackson, 2002 OK 65, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 1044, 1046; State v. Archuleta, 857 P.2d 234, 239 
(Utah 1993); Circuit Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. v. Lee Newspapers, 2014 WY 101, 332 P.3d 523, 530 
(Wyo. 2014). 
124. See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014); Newsday L.L.C. v. Cty. of 
Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2013); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 86, 93 (2d 
Cir. 2004); Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc., 24 F.3d at 897; Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 
998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993); Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253; In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d at 1309; 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1177; Ex parte Capital U-Drive-It, Inc., 630 S.E.2d 
464, 469 (S.C. 2006). But see In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1331-40 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding no First Amendment right to discovery materials); Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“With respect to the question 
whether the common law right to inspect and copy [discovery materials] has a constitutional dimen- 
sion, we conclude that it does not.”). 
125. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Associated Press, 705 
F.2d at 1145); see also United States v. Salemme, 985 F. Supp. 193, 195 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting that 
access to court records is “often important to a full understanding of the way in which the judicial pro- 
cess and the government as a whole are functioning.”). 
126. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604 (1982) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 
(1966)); see also supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
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access to the materials with which the courts work, including documents, 
evidence, and legal briefs, to understand how and why a court arrived at 
its decisions.127 As the District of Columbia Circuit remarked: 
A court proceeding, unlike the processes for much decisionmaking 
by executive and legislative officials, is in its entirety and by its very 
nature a matter of legal significance; all of the documents filed with 
the court, as well as the transcript of the proceeding itself, are main- 
tained as the official “record” of what transpired.128 
Admittedly, some lower courts remain unsure whether the First 
Amendment requires public access to court records or whether the pub- 
lic merely enjoys a common law right of access. This uncertainty can be 
traced to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon v. Warner Communica- 
tions,129 which preceded by two years the Court’s pronouncement in 
Richmond Newspapers that the First Amendment provides a public right 
of access to criminal trials.130 In Nixon, several television networks sought 
access to tape recordings that had been introduced as evidence at the tri- 
al of President Nixon’s former advisors on charges of conspiring to ob- 
struct justice in connection with the Watergate investigation.131 Although 
the trial court made transcripts of the recordings available to the public, 
the media companies argued that the public should be able to hear the 
actual conversations, replete with nuance and inflection.132 
Instead of resolving the question of whether the First Amendment 
provides a right of access to the tapes, the Court sidestepped the consti- 
tutional issue by focusing on the public availability of the transcripts.133 
Because the tapes had already been played in open court, the Court con- 
cluded that “[t]here is no question of a truncated flow of information to 
the public.”134 The only issue the Court saw with regard to the First 
Amendment was whether “copies of the White House tapes—to which 
the public has never had physical access—must be made available for 
copying.”135 Seeing this as a case about special access for the press, the 
Court held that “[t]he First Amendment generally grants the press no 
right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public,” 
which could have listened to the tapes in the courtroom.136 In framing the 
 
127. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 911–12 (noting the essential role that court 
records play in the public’s understanding of the courts); Martin, supra note 11, at 859 (“[E]ffective 
public understanding and scrutiny of the judicial process require access to rulings of the court and to 
documents filed by parties.”); accord In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 52; In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. 
Litig., 732 F.2d at 1308; United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982); Salemme, 985 F. 
Supp. at 195. 
128. Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
129. 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 
130. 448 U.S. 555, 583 (1980). 
131.  Nixon, 435 U.S. at 592–94. 
132.   Id. at 589. 
133.   Id. at 609. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. The Supreme Court did state in Nixon that there is a common-law right to “inspect and 
copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Id. at 597. As a result, 
even courts that do not recognize a First Amendment right of access to court records acknowledge 
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issue as it did, the Court left open the question of whether the First 
Amendment would have been implicated if the trial court had refused to 
provide any public access to the contents of the tapes. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the few courts that do not apply a First 
Amendment right of access to court records are misreading Nixon and 
ignoring the Supreme Court’s subsequent access decisions.137 The Su- 
preme Court has made clear that a central purpose of the First Amend- 
ment is to ensure that citizens can effectively participate in and contrib- 
ute to our republican system of self-government.138 The majority of courts 
have recognized that to effectuate this goal the public’s right of access to 
the courts must extend to the materials in a court’s files because the doc- 
uments and other materials associated with court proceedings are indis- 
pensable for the public to understand the work of the courts.139 As the 
Third Circuit concluded in United States v. Antar: 
Access to the documentation of an open proceeding . . . facilitates 
the openness of the proceeding itself by assuring the broadest dis- 
semination. It would be an odd result indeed were we to declare 
that our courtrooms must be open, but that transcripts of the pro- 
ceedings occurring there may be closed, for what exists of the right 
of access if it extends only to those who can squeeze through the 
door?140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that the public has a common-law right of access to judicial records in both civil and criminal cases. 
See, e.g., IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1222 (8th Cir. 2013); Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 
1433–34 (9th Cir. 1995); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 
1993); Republic of Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659–60 (3d Cir. 1991); Smith v. 
U.S. Dist. Ct., 956 F.2d 647, 649–50 (7th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp., 951 
F.2d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1990); Littlejohn v. 
BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677–78 (3d Cir. 1988); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 
(1st Cir. 1987); Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 1986); Wilson v. 
Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982); 
see also Richard J. Peltz et al., The Arkansas Proposal on Access to Court Records: Upgrading the 
Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information Norms, 59 ARK. L. REV. 555, 591–94  (2006) 
(listing state decisions). 
137. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 873–78. 
138. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
139. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (“[O]fficial records and docu- 
ments open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.”); Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 
F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Secrecy makes it difficult for the public (including the bar) to un- 
derstand the grounds and motivations of a decision, why the case was brought (and fought), and what 
exactly was at stake in it.”); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(“[R]ight of access to judicial documents [is] derived from or a necessary corollary of the capacity to 
attend the relevant proceedings.”); United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[Pub- 
lic monitoring of the courts] is not possible without access to . . . documents that are used in the per- 
formance of Article III functions.”); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 803 (11th Cir. 1983) (“This 
right, like the right to attend judicial proceedings, is important if the public is to appreciate fully the 
often significant events at issue in public litigation and the workings of the legal system.”). 
140. 38 F.3d 1348, 1360 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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IV. RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN PRIVACY AND COURT ACCESS 
Although public access to the courts is an important feature of the 
American legal system, the public does not have an absolute right to ac- 
cess court proceedings and records.141 As with other First Amendment 
rights, public access can be denied when countervailing interests are suf- 
ficiently compelling. The Supreme Court has warned, however, that “the 
State’s justification in denying access must be a weighty one”142 and that 
“[c]losed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be ra- 
re.”143 Although the Court has used slightly different wording when eval- 
uating restrictions on public access—sometimes requiring that re- 
strictions be “essential to preserve higher values”144 and at other times 
stating that they must be “necessitated by a compelling governmental in- 
terest”145—the test for restricting public access to the courts generally 
matches the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test, as applied in other First 
Amendment contexts.146 
As the preceding paragraph suggests, the public’s right of access 
generally takes precedent over most countervailing interests. Under the 
strict scrutiny test, the “strong presumption” of public access can be 
overcome when three requirements are satisfied: (1) the restrictions on 
access advance a compelling interest that is likely to be prejudiced by 
public access; (2) the restrictions are no broader than necessary to pro- 
tect that interest; and (3) there are no other reasonable alternatives to 
restricting public access.147 The latter two requirements involve a “pri- 
marily empirical judgment about the means” used to advance the state’s 
interest.148 As Eugene Volokh explains, “[i]f the means do not actually 
further the interest, are too broad, are too narrow, or are unnecessarily 
burdensome, then the government can and should serve the end through 
[alternative  means].”149 
 
141. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 606 (1980). 
142. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606. 
143. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509. 
144. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13–14 (“[P]roceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on 
the record findings are made demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to preserve higher values and is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”) (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510). 
145. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07 (“Where . . . the State attempts to deny the right of 
access . . . it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and 
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”). 
146. See, e.g., Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding 
that “strict scrutiny is the correct standard” to be applied in access disputes governed by the First 
Amendment). 
147. Courts sometimes differ about the level of certainty that must be shown in order to establish 
harm, at times requiring the likelihood of prejudice while at other times requiring a substantial proba- 
bility of prejudice. Compare N.Y.C. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. City Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 
304 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted) (requiring “an overriding interest 
that is likely to be prejudiced”), with United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (in- 
ternal quotations omitted) (citation omitted) (requiring a showing that “there is a substantial probabil- 
ity that, in the absence of closure, this compelling interest would be harmed”). 
148. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2419 (1996). 
149. Id. 
 
 
 
 
No. 5] PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS 1409 
 
Additionally, if a court concludes that restrictions on public access 
are warranted, it must provide specific on-the-record findings justifying 
its conclusion. 150 The Supreme Court instructed in Press-Enterprise I that 
“[t]he interest [supporting closure] is to be articulated along with findings 
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure 
order was properly entered.”151 The requirement of on-the-record find- 
ings, however, is not solely for the benefit of appellate review. It “exists, 
most fundamentally, to assure careful analysis by the [trial] court before 
any limitation is imposed, because reversal cannot fully vindicate First 
Amendment rights.”152 
As described below, courts have adopted a variety of approaches to 
reconciling the tension between privacy and court access. In fact, in many 
courthouses, the details of public access are left to court clerks, who fash- 
ion access policies from a variety of legal sources.153 This Section de- 
scribes how the First Amendment right of access to court records should 
be carried out. 
At the outset, however, it should be noted that many questions re- 
garding how to implement public access to court records remain unre- 
solved. Nevertheless, there are three essential questions that courts can- 
not avoid when considering public access claims. Who has a right to 
access court records? What records does the public have a right to ac- 
cess? And how must the courts provide this access? 
 
A. Limits on Who May Access Court Records 
The first question that arises is whether the courts can place limits 
on who may access court records. This question can come up in two dif- 
ferent ways. First, a court may seek to impose restrictions on the identity 
of those who are granted access to court records. Second, a court may at- 
tempt to impose restrictions on how the records can be used once they 
are acquired from the court. 
 
1. Restrictions on the Identity of Court Record Users 
Given that the most frequent users of court records are commercial 
entities—a fact that creates heightened concerns about privacy because 
these entities typically aggregate court records with other information— 
some commentators have proposed prohibiting commercial users from 
 
150. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980); Romero v. Drummond 
Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 313–14 (2d Cir. 
2004); In re Time Inc., 182 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 1999); People v. LaGrone, 838 N.E.2d 142, 547 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2005). 
151. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510. 
152. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1362 (3d Cir. 1994). 
153. Conley et al., supra note 2, at 787 (“[R]estrictions on access trickle down from state and fed- 
eral appellate courts to the local courthouses themselves, where state and local law, custom, and in 
some cases simply the whims of court clerks determine which information in the court record will ac- 
tually be made available to the public, and how.”). 
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accessing government records.154 Such an approach, however, would al- 
most certainly run afoul of the First Amendment. 
As a general matter, the First Amendment does not permit the gov- 
ernment to discriminate between different types of private actors with 
regard to their expressive activities. In a long line of cases, the Supreme 
Court has held that First Amendment rights do not depend on the identi- 
ty of a speaker and that the government cannot single out some types of 
speakers for differential treatment unless it can demonstrate a compel- 
ling reason for doing so.155 For example, the government cannot arbitrari- 
ly exclude reporters from White House press conferences,156 distinguish 
between media and nonmedia defendants for purposes of defamation 
law,157 impose a higher tax rate on newspapers of a certain size,158 or re- 
fuse to allow certain members of the press to interview government offi- 
 
 
 
154. See Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1216 (suggesting that courts “curtail 
broad categories of uses (i.e., commercial, information brokering, further disclosure, and so on).”); 
Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. Iʟʟ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 
357, 375 (2006) (“[A]ccessing public records to obtain data for commercial solicitation should be pro- 
hibited.”). 
155. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010) (“[T]he Gov- 
ernment may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.”); 
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (enjoining enforcement of a gross receipts tax 
imposed only on newspapers with circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week). As the Supreme 
Court noted in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court “has upheld a narrow class 
of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based 
on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.” 558 U.S. at 341 (citing 
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (protecting the “function of public 
school education”)); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (furthering 
“the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (ensuring “the capacity of the Government to discharge its 
[military] responsibilities”) (internal quotation marks omitted); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n 
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973) (“[F]ederal service should depend upon meritorious per- 
formance rather than political service . . . .”). 
156. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Am. Broad. Cos. v. Cuomo, 
570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that political candidates could not selectively exclude ABC 
from “public function[s]” while admitting other media representatives); United Teachers of Dade v. 
Stierheim, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373–74 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (teachers’ union and editor of union news- 
paper could not be excluded from the press room reserved for members of the “general-circulation” 
media and relegated to a “separate but equal” media room); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 909–10 
(D. Haw. 1974); Westinghouse Broad. Co. v. Dukakis, 409 F. Supp. 895, 896 (D. Mass. 1976) (selective 
exclusion of one television station from press conference violated the First Amendment) (enjoining 
mayor from excluding reporter from general news conferences). 
157. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 753 (1985) (plurality 
opinion) (rejecting the Vermont Supreme Court’s conclusion that nonmedia defendants are not enti- 
tled to First Amendment protection); id. at 773 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 784 (Brennan, J., 
joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Although the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps seemed to put the rejection of the media/nonmedia distinction 
in Dun & Bradstreet into question, see 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986), such a view is against the weight of 
authority in the lower courts, see, for example, Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 
2014); Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 1994), and is in conflict with the Court’s lan- 
guage in Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (“We have consistently rejected the proposition that the insti- 
tutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.”). 
158. See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 251; see also Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 
230 (1987) (“[O]fficial scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely 
incompatible with the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press.”). 
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cials.159 Nor may the government suppress speech on the basis of the 
speaker’s corporate identity.160 As the Court reaffirmed in Citizens Unit- 
ed v. Federal Election Commission, “[t]he First Amendment does not 
permit Congress to [disadvantage speakers] based on the corporate iden- 
tity of the speaker and the content of the political speech.”161 
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether 
the First Amendment prohibits a court from providing access to court 
records to only some members of the public, and while this issue has not 
received much attention in the lower courts, some cases have held that 
discriminatory access to court information can violate the First Amend- 
ment.162 The First Circuit’s decision in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. illus- 
trates the constitutional problems that can arise when courts provide un- 
equal access to court records.163 In Anderson, the district court sealed the 
records associated with a civil lawsuit related to the discharge of toxic 
chemicals into the water supply in Woburn, Massachusetts, but it granted 
WGBH, which was preparing a documentary for the Public Broadcasting 
Services NOVA television series, access to some records.164 The case, 
which ultimately served as the basis for a national bestseller and movie 
titled A Civil Action, generated a great deal of public interest, and when 
CBS, Inc. and The Boston Globe requested access to documents that had 
been provided to WGBH, the district court refused to grant them ac- 
cess.165 
In reversing the district court’s protective order, the First Circuit 
wrote: 
Our main concern with the exception for WGBH . . . is not with the 
jury’s exposure to the information, but with the government’s grant- 
ing of access only to designated media entities. . . . [T]his exception 
gave WGBH the exclusive ability among the media to gather in- 
 
159. See Chi. Reader v. Sheahan, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Times Picayune 
Publ’g Co. v. Lee, Civ. A. No. 88-1325, 1988 WL 36491, at *1 (E.D. La. 1988). 
160. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364. 
161. Id. 
162. See, e.g., Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116, 121, 146 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the First 
Amendment was violated when the trial court singled out “a long-time critic of the Vermont justice 
system . . . for exclusion from the courtroom”); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1986) 
(holding that a court “may not selectively exclude news media from access to information otherwise 
made available for public dissemination”); United States v. Connolly, 204 F. Supp. 2d 138, 139–40 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (refusing to remove subpoenaed reporters from the courtroom and noting that it “is be- 
yond dispute that only in the most extraordinary circumstances is the government permitted, con- 
sistent with the First Amendment, to discriminate between members of the press in granting access to 
trials and other governmental proceedings”); cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 
(1978) (noting that discriminatory restrictions may represent a governmental “attempt to give one side 
of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people”); Legi-Tech, Inc. v. 
Keiper, 766 F.2d 728, 733 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that providing preferential access to legislative mate- 
rials to one legislative information service violated the First Amendment rights of a competing ser- 
vice). 
163.  805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986). 
164. Id. at 3. WGBH was prohibited from revealing the information it obtained from these 
sources until after jury selection. Id. 
165. Id. at 4. The excluded media companies sought access to records filed by the parties in sup- 
port of their motions to compel discovery and for summary judgment. Id. 
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formation and release it to the public. By the grace of the court, 
WGBH became a privileged media entity that could, over a four 
month period, review otherwise confidential information and shape 
the form and content of the initial presentation of the material to 
the public. It is of no consequence that others could then republish 
the information WGBH had chosen to release. A court may not se- 
lectively exclude news media from access to information otherwise 
made available for public dissemination.166 
The First Circuit went on to note that allowing a court to provide public 
access to some members of the public but not to others was a clear viola- 
tion of the First Amendment: 
The danger in granting favorable treatment to certain members of 
the media is obvious: it allows the government to influence the type 
of substantive media coverage that public events will receive. Such 
a practice is unquestionably at odds with the first amendment. Nei- 
ther the courts nor any other branch of the government can be al- 
lowed to affect the content or tenor of the news by choreographing 
which news organizations have access to relevant information.167 
While some commentators have argued that the “press” should re- 
ceive additional rights and protections under the First Amendment be- 
yond those provided to the public generally,168 that view has never com- 
manded a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court.169 Instead, the 
Court has been wary of granting certain media entities preferential 
treatment under the First Amendment and has evidenced skepticism that 
such line drawing is even possible.170 As a result, the freedoms the press 
receives from the First Amendment are no different from the freedoms 
everyone enjoys under the Speech Clause.171 In the context of court ac- 
cess, for example, the Court has repeatedly framed the issue as one of a 
right of access by the public and has refused to grant the press any special 
rights beyond those enjoyed by the public.172 
 
166. Id. at 9. 
167. Id. 
168. See Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it  
Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 641 (1975); Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633–34 (1975); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1025, 1027 (2011). 
169. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concur- 
ring) (“[T]he history of the [Press] Clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a ‘special’ or 
‘institutional’ privilege.”); see also David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. 
REV. 455, 456 (1983) (“Thus far the Supreme Court has declined to give independent significance to 
the phrase ‘freedom of the press.’”). 
170. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781–82 (1985); 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972). 
171. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (“The press is 
protected from most government censorship, libel judgments, and prior restraints not because it is the 
press but because the Speech Clause protects all of us from those threats.”). This is not to say that me- 
dia entities do not enjoy special privileges that are not available to the general public. As David An- 
derson notes: “Nonconstitutional sources of special protection for the press are . . . numerous.” Id. at 
432. 
172. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9; Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978); Nix- 
on v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974). As a 
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In practical terms, the recognition that the First Amendment pre- 
cludes the courts from discriminating between members of the public 
with regard to access to court records would not mark a dramatic shift in 
the current practice of most courts. The federal courts, for example, do 
not exclude any individuals or entities from accessing publicly available 
court records, and PACER is available to anyone who registers for an 
account.173 State courts appear to be similarly permissive in their court 
access policies, at least with regard to who can access publicly available 
paper records.174 
 
2. Restrictions on the Uses of Court Records 
Instead of restricting who can access court records, courts may seek 
to limit how the information in court records can be used. For example, 
some statutes and court rules prohibit certain nonpreferred uses of court 
records.175 Can courts go further and require that their records not be 
modified, posted online, or aggregated with other personal information? 
Can courts restrict commercial uses of their records? Court records hold 
great value to many commercial enterprises, and we can expect that 
commercial users of court records will vigorously oppose any such re- 
strictions. 
The Supreme Court has not directly answered these questions, but 
we can draw several conclusions from the Court’s extensive body of First 
Amendment jurisprudence that address the government’s ability to con- 
trol the dissemination of lawfully acquired information. First, it is unlike- 
ly that the courts can restrict or punish the dissemination of information 
contained in publicly available court records. The Supreme Court has re- 
peatedly held that the First Amendment protects the right to publish 
 
practical matter, many courts do reserve seats in the courtroom for credential journalists. See, e.g., 
TIMOTHY R. MURPHY  ET  AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MANAGING NOTORIOUS TRIALS 44– 
47 (1998) (“Generally, one-fourth to one half of the seats in a courtroom are reserved for the media, 
with the rest of the space allocated between the parties and the public.”); SUPREME COURT PUB. INFO. 
OFFICE, REQUIREMENTS  AND PROCEDURES  FOR ISSUING SUPREME COURT PRESS CREDENTIALS 1 
(2015) (“The Courtroom has a limited number of seats set aside exclusively for the media . . . .”). 
173. See PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/ (last visited June 20, 2017). 
174. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mobley, 47 So. 590, 593 (Ala. 1908); Werfel v. Fitzgerald, 260 N.Y.S.2d 
791, 798 (1965); State ex rel. Journal Co. v. Cty. Court, 168 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Wis. 1969); COLO. 
JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 2.00 (2006); IND. ADMINISTRATIVE R. 9(B), 
cmt. 
175. See ALASKA R. ADMINISTRATION 37.8(b)(4) (prohibiting bulk distribution of records except 
for scholarly or governmental purposes); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-305.5 (2016) (prohibiting use of 
“[r]ecords of official actions and criminal justice records” for commercial solicitation); IDAHO R. 
ADMINISTRATION 32(e) (allowing bulk access only for scholarly, journalistic, political, governmental, 
research, evaluation, or statistical purposes); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-230 (2016) (prohibiting use of 
names and addresses collected from public records “for the purpose of selling or offering for sale any 
property or service”); 2 WASH. PRACTICE, RULES PRACTICE Gr 31(g) (7th ed.) (“The use of court rec- 
ords, distributed in bulk form, for the purpose of commercial solicitation of individuals named in the 
court records is prohibited.”). Most states, however, appear to be agnostic as to how their records are 
used. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF COURT 10.500(e)(4); COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
COURT RECORDS § 2.00(a)(4); MO. SUPREME COURT OPERATING R. 2.03(j)(4). The federal courts 
also currently do not limit the uses of court records. 
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lawfully acquired information about matters of public concern.176 If the 
government seeks to punish the publication of such information, it must 
show a state interest “of the highest order.”177 Moreover, this protection 
is not lost even if the information was inadvertently disclosed or was ille- 
gally acquired in the first place, so long as the publisher was not involved 
in the initial illegality.178 
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, for example, the Court ad- 
dressed whether a television broadcaster could face liability for disclos- 
ing the name of a deceased rape victim in violation of Georgia’s rape 
shield statute.179 In a unanimous decision rejecting the victim’s privacy 
claim,180 Justice Byron White noted that the station’s reporter had ac- 
quired the name of the victim from court testimony and records—namely 
the state’s rape and murder indictments, which were publicly available at 
the courthouse.181 Although the Court was sympathetic to the plaintiff’s 
privacy claims,182 it held that “the interests in privacy fade when the in- 
formation involved already appears on the public record.”183 As Justice 
White reasoned: 
Public records by their very nature are of interest to those con- 
cerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit 
is performed by the reporting of the true contents of the records by 
the media. The freedom of the press to publish that information ap- 
pears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government in 
which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public 
business.184 
If the Court had held otherwise—that a publisher could be liable for 
disclosing a rape victim’s name that appears in public court records—this 
would have a chilling effect on the coverage of court cases, an outcome 
that Justice White noted was a concern for the Court: 
Such a rule would make it very difficult for the media to inform citi- 
zens about the public business and yet stay within the law. The rule 
would invite timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead to the 
suppression of many items that would otherwise be published and 
176. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 
526 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469, 496 (1975). 
177. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528. 
178. See id. at 525 (holding that an illegally taped telephone conversation was lawfully acquired 
information as to the radio station and the individual to whom it was anonymously supplied); Florida 
Star, 491 U.S. at 526 (refusing to hold a newspaper liable for publishing a rape victim’s name even 
though the sheriff’s department inadvertently released the name); Landmark Communc’ns, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845–46 (1978) (holding that a newspaper could not be fined for naming a judge 
who was being investigated by a judicial commission even though information was illegally leaked). 
179. 420 U.S. 469, 471–72 (1975). 
180. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion stating that he would dismiss the appeal for want 
of jurisdiction. Id. at 501. 
181.  Id. at 472–73. 
182. See id. at 487 (“[P]owerful arguments can be made, and have been made, that however it 
may be ultimately defined, there is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual, a zone within which 
the State may protect him from intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity.”). 
183.  Id. at 494–95. 
184.   Id. at 495. 
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that should be made available to the public. At the very least, the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press 
to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the pub- 
lic in official court records.185 
As a result, the Court in Cox Broadcasting put the burden squarely 
on the government to keep sensitive information out of a court’s files in 
the first place, instructing that “[i]f there are privacy interests to be pro- 
tected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which 
avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information.”186 
Once such information is disclosed in a court’s records, the state bears a 
very heavy burden in restricting its dissemination.187 
Notwithstanding the First Amendment’s protections for the dissem- 
ination of information in court records, can courts impose restrictions on 
the use of court records as a condition of access to the records in the first 
place? The Constitution typically does not permit the government to 
grant a benefit on the precondition that the beneficiary surrender a con- 
stitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit alto- 
gether.188 Under what is known as the “unconstitutional conditions doc- 
trine,”189 the government cannot, for example: condition the receipt of 
public funds on the acceptance of content-based restrictions on speech;190 
permit the placement of news racks on public property on the condition 
that the publications not contain advertising;191 or provide tax exemptions 
only for newspapers and other publications that contain certain types of 
content.192 Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the ques- 
tion of whether the government can require requesters to sign speech- 
 
185.   Id. at 496. 
186. Id. 
187. It is also unlikely that courts will be able to enjoin the publication of information contained 
in publicly available court records. See Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 309 (1977) (strik- 
ing down a pretrial order that enjoined news media from publishing the name or picture of a child); 
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (invalidating an order prohibiting publication or 
broadcast of accounts of confessions or admissions made by a criminal defendant and noting that prior 
restraints bear a “heavy presumption” against their constitutional validity). 
188. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013); 
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 427–28 (1993); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. 
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230–31 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). There are sever- 
al exceptions to this general rule, including restrictions on the speech of government employees and 
the ever-growing government speech doctrine, but they are not relevant here. See, e.g., Rust v. Sulli- 
van, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
189. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 
(1989). 
190. See Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2332 (holding that a requirement that nongovernmen- 
tal organizations institute an explicit anti-prostitution policy in order to receive federal funding violat- 
ed the First Amendment); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (invali- 
dating a statute that forbade any noncommercial educational station that received a grant from the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting from “engag[ing] in editorializing”). But see Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (upholding a statute that allowed nonprofits to 
receive tax-deductible contributions only if they abstained from lobbying). 
191. See Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 427–28 (holding that a content-based regulation of 
the placement of news racks was subject to First Amendment scrutiny). 
192. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 224, 230–31 (holding a state sales tax scheme that 
provided exemption only for newspapers and “religious, professional, trade, and sports journals and/or 
publications printed and published within this State” unconstitutional). 
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restrictive contracts as a condition of accessing government information, 
a majority of the Justices have cast doubt on the constitutionality of such 
a practice. 
In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing  
Corp., a commercial data broker challenged a California statute that im- 
posed two restrictions on the use of arrestee addresses held by the Los 
Angeles Police Department: that the person requesting an address de- 
clare that the request is being made for one of five prescribed purposes 
and that the requester also declare that the address will not be used di- 
rectly or indirectly to sell a product or service.193 In dismissing the pub- 
lisher’s First Amendment claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the 
company never attempted to qualify for the records and did not advance 
the argument that its own First Amendment rights were infringed.194 In- 
stead, United Reporting mounted a facial attack on the statute, which 
Rehnquist rejected, concluding that the public enjoys no general right to 
information held by the police department.195 Yet, a close reading of the 
concurring and dissenting opinions reveals that eight Justices were in 
agreement that the First Amendment would limit California’s freedom to 
decide how to distribute the information if the state had decided to make 
it available to some members of the public.196 As Justice Scalia remarked 
in his concurrence, “a restriction upon access that allows access to the 
press . . . but at the same time denies access to persons who wish to use 
the information for certain speech purposes, is in reality a restriction up- 
on speech.”197 
Conditioning access to court records on how they are to be used 
would be even more troubling than conditioning access to police records 
because the public has a presumptive right of access to court records un- 
der the First Amendment. Moreover, given the concern evidenced by 
eight of the Justices in United Reporting, as well as the Court’s longstand- 
ing aversion to allowing the government to condition the grant of a bene- 
fit on the relinquishment of a right to equal treatment, it is unlikely that 
the government can, without demonstrating compelling reasons for doing 
so, provide access to court records to some members of the public and 
 
193.  528 U.S. 32, 35 (1999). 
194. Id. at 40. 
195. Id. (“For purposes of assessing the propriety of a facial invalidation, what we have before us 
is nothing more than a governmental denial of access to information in its possession.”). For more on 
how the Supreme Court’s decision in United Reporting deviates from the Court’s First Amendment 
access jurisprudence, see Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 849–50. 
196. See United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] restriction upon access that 
allows access to the press . . . but at the same time denies access to persons who wish to use the infor- 
mation for certain speech purposes, is in reality a restriction upon speech.”); id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., 
joined by O’Conner, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he provision of [government] infor- 
mation is a kind of subsidy to people who wish to speak [about certain subjects,] and once a State de- 
cides to make such a benefit available to the public, there are no doubt limits to its freedom to decide 
how that benefit will be distributed.”); id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause the State’s dis- 
crimination is based on its desire to prevent the information from being used for constitutionally pro- 
tected purposes . . . it must assume the burden of justifying its conduct.”). 
197. Id. at 42 (emphasis in original). 
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not others based on how they plan to use the records. Indeed, a number 
of lower courts have held that restrictions on the use of government rec- 
ords—even when there is no right of public access in the first place—do 
trigger First Amendment scrutiny.198 The few courts that have held oth- 
erwise seem to have taken the decision in United Reporting too far in 
concluding that anytime there is no First Amendment right of access to a 
government record, the government can freely discriminate with regard 
to how the record is used.199 
Given the conclusion that restrictions on the use of court records 
must survive strict scrutiny, those seeking to impose conditions on access 
might instead argue that limitations on the use of court records are mere- 
ly restrictions on conduct, rather than speech, and are therefore not sub- 
ject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. Such an argument, however, is 
unlikely to be successful. 
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court invalidated a 
Vermont statute that restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy 
records that revealed the prescribing practices of individual doctors.200 In 
an effort to avoid First Amendment scrutiny, Vermont asserted that the 
statute did not restrict speech but simply regulated access to the infor- 
mation.201 Noting that the state’s argument “finds some support in Los 
Angeles  Police  Dept.  v.  United  Reporting  Publishing  Corp.,”  202   Justice 
 
198. See, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State of Colo., 21 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding 
that the First Amendment was implicated by a statute that restricted the use of criminal justice records 
because the state “disallow[ed] the release of records to those wishing to use them for commercial 
speech, while allowing the release of the same records to those having a noncommercial purpose”); 
Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007, 1010 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that “[a] first amendment challenge is ap- 
propriate where a state prohibits the use of public records by one who wishes to engage in non- 
misleading, truthful commercial speech”); Innovative Database Sys. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217, 222 (5th 
Cir. 1993) (striking down a statute that restricted access to crime victim and motor vehicle accident 
information for commercial solicitation purposes); Legi–Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728, 731 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (holding a statute unconstitutional that permitted the general public to access a state- 
maintained database of pending legislation but denied such access to “those entities which offer for 
sale the services of an electronic information retrieval system which contains data relating to the pro- 
ceedings of the legislature”); Babkes v. Satz, 944 F. Supp. 909, 913 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that a 
statute that restricted commercial use of names and addresses on traffic citations violated the First 
Amendment); Mahan v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 315 S.E.2d 829, 835 (Va. 1984) 
(declaring unconstitutional a statute that restricted the entities entitled to obtain copies of statewide 
list of registered voters). 
199. See Spottsville v. Barnes, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (finding that the First 
Amendment was not implicated by a statute that restricted access to motor vehicle accident reports for 
commercial solicitation because “there is no First Amendment right of access to public information”); 
Walker v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 466 S.E.2d 346, 348 (S.C. 1995) (holding that the 
First Amendment was not implicated by a statute prohibiting disclosure of motor vehicle accident re- 
ports if sought for commercial solicitation purposes because the public has no right to reports). 
200. 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). The statute at issue stated in relevant part that “[p]harmaceutical 
manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use prescriber-identifiable information for 
marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber consents . . . .” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, § 4631(d) (2011), invalidated by Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557. The statute contained a number of excep- 
tions for healthcare research, enforcing compliance with insurance formularies, care-management ed- 
ucational communications sent to patients about their conditions, law enforcement operations, and 
other purposes provided by law. Id. § 4631(e). 
201. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567. 
202. Id. at 568 (citing L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999)). 
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Anthony Kennedy, writing for the six-Justice majority, distinguished that 
case on two grounds. First, he noted that the Vermont statute imposed a 
restriction not only on the government’s disclosure of the information 
but also on private pharmacies that wished to distribute the infor- 
mation.203 Second, and “more important[ly],” Kennedy concluded that 
the statute’s restrictions on access to the information burdened the 
speech of drug companies and data miners who sought to make use of 
the covered information.204 
This second point warrants additional exploration because it gets to 
the heart of the question we are trying to answer: whether the govern- 
ment can condition access to court records on the agreement that they be 
used only for certain purposes. Sorrell casts significant doubt on the ar- 
gument that such a requirement would be considered a restriction on 
conduct rather than speech. In rejecting Vermont’s claim that the statute 
should not be subjected to any First Amendment scrutiny, Kennedy 
scoffed at the idea that the prescriber-identifying information was “a 
mere ‘commodity’ with no greater entitlement to First Amendment pro- 
tection than ‘beef jerky[.]’”205 According to Kennedy: 
This Court has held that the creation and dissemination of infor- 
mation are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment. 
Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that 
is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct hu- 
man affairs. There is thus a strong argument that prescriber- 
identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes.206 
Although Kennedy ultimately concluded that the Court need not 
resolve the question of whether the prescriber-identifying information at 
issue in Sorrell was “speech” because Vermont’s restrictions on the use 
of the information in marketing triggered First Amendment scrutiny in 
any event,207 the Court’s suggestion in Sorrell that restrictions on access 
to information, standing alone, implicate the First Amendment’s speech 
protections  is significant. 
Indeed, this question has long been a point of contention for schol- 
ars208 and of confusion for many lower courts.209 The conclusion that limi- 
 
203.  Id. at 568–69. 
204.   Id. at 569. 
205. Id. at 570 (quoting IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated 
by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011)). 
206. Id. (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001)) (“[I]f the acts of ‘disclosing’ and 
‘publishing’ information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that cate- 
gory, as distinct from the category of expressive conduct.”) (internal citations omitted). 
207. Id. at 571. Kennedy determined that the statute was a speaker- and content-based restriction 
on speech because it singled out a specific class of speakers (pharmaceutical companies) and certain 
uses of the information (product marketing) for disfavored treatment. Id. at 563–64. Other entities and 
individuals, including those who planned to engage in “educational communications” were permitted 
to use the pharmacy records. Id. at 564. 
208. Compare, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014) (“[F]or all 
practical purposes, and in every context relevant to the current debates in information law, data is 
speech. Privacy regulations are rarely incidental burdens to knowledge. Instead, they are deliberately 
designed to disrupt knowledge creation.”), and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information 
Privacy:  The  Troubling  Implications of  a  Right  to  Stop  People  From  Speaking  About You, 52 STAN. L. 
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tations on access to information do not burden speech would effectively 
free the government to impose almost any restrictions on access to gov- 
ernment information; conversely, the conclusion that restrictions on ac- 
cess to government information do burden speech and thus trigger First 
Amendment scrutiny will sharply limit the extent to which the govern- 
ment can restrict access.210 It is unlikely that Sorrell will end the debate 
on this point, but it adds support to the view that government restrictions 
on access to information can implicate the First Amendment regardless 
of whether the public enjoys a general right of access to the information 
in the first place. 
Some scholars have also argued that, because commercial speech 
receives lesser protection under the First Amendment, the courts have 
more leeway to prohibit commercial uses of government records.211 The 
Court’s decision in Sorrell, however, indicates that the government must 
still meet a very high standard to restrict even commercial uses of infor- 
mation. Without resolving whether the Vermont statute burdened more 
than just commercial speech, and thus should be subject to strict scruti- 
ny,212 Justice Kennedy concluded that, even under intermediate scrutiny, 
the statute could not pass constitutional muster.213 Kennedy’s suggestion 
 
REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2000) (concluding that the First Amendment “generally bars the government 
from controlling the communication of information,” and that “information privacy rules are not easi- 
ly defensible under existing free speech law”), with Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational 
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1414 (2000) (“In the sense that counts for 
First Amendment purposes, personally-identified data is not collected, used or sold for its expressive 
content at all; it is a tool for processing people, not a vehicle for injecting communication into the 
‘marketplace of ideas.’”), and Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1166 (2005) (arguing that “most data privacy regulations in the form of a ‘code of 
fair information practices’ have nothing to do with free speech under anyone’s definition”). 
209. Compare Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 52–53 (finding a statute that regulated the disclosure of pre- 
scriber-identifying information to be “principally regulat[ing] conduct, and to the extent that the chal- 
lenged portions impinge at all upon speech, that speech is of scant societal value”), with Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven dry information, devoid of advocacy, 
political relevance, or artistic expression, has been accorded First Amendment protection.”). 
210. See Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1501, 1522 (2015) (“If data were speech, every restriction on the disclosure—not to mention the 
collection or use—of information would face heightened First Amendment scrutiny, and would be 
presumptively unconstitutional.”); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy 
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 976–1032 (2003) (noting that “speech” is very diffi- 
cult to define and discussing the various approaches to resolving this issue in the context of privacy 
regulation). 
211. See Brian N. Larson & Genelle I. Belmas, Second Class for the Second Time: How the Com- 
mercial Speech Doctrine Stigmatizes Commercial Use  of  Aggregated  Public  Records,  58  S.C. L. REV. 
935, 978 (2007); Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton, Commercializing Public Sector Information, 97 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 412, 437–38 (2015). 
212. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571 (“[T]he outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech 
inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied. . . . [T]here is no need to determine whether all 
speech hampered by [the statute] is commercial, as our cases have used that term.”). 
213. Id. at 572 (requiring that the statute “directly advances a substantial governmental interest 
and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest”). Kennedy concluded that Vermont’s asserted 
interest in protecting the privacy of physicians could not justify the restrictions because the statute 
permitted disclosure of prescriber-identifying information for any purpose other than marketing, so 
the law did not actually advance the goal of protecting privacy. Id. at 572–73. The Court also rejected 
Vermont’s assertion that the statute advanced the state’s goal of reducing the cost of medical services 
by pushing doctors to prescribe more generic drugs, finding that such a paternalistic effort to shield 
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that commercial speech restrictions always trigger some form of “height- 
ened scrutiny”214 has prompted some scholars to conclude that Sorrell 
blurred the distinction between fully protected expression and “lesser- 
value” commercial speech.215 
Whether the Court will continue to vigorously scrutinize all com- 
mercial-speech restrictions remains an open question, but many com- 
mentators view the Sorrell decision as emblematic of the Court’s more 
searching review of government restrictions on commercial speech.216 
How the courts treat commercial uses of government information has 
particular importance for court access because most court records— 
indeed, the vast majority of government records as a whole—are ac- 
quired by commercial resellers.217 It was, therefore, no coincidence that 
the complaining parties in Sorrell and United Reporting were data bro- 
kers.218 
Although at least one lower court has upheld restrictions on the 
commercial use of court records,219 it is unclear whether that decision will 
stand up to the Court’s more searching review of commercial speech re- 
strictions after Sorrell. In Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State of Colorado, the 
Tenth Circuit upheld a state statute that disallowed the release of crimi- 
nal justice records to those wishing to use them for the purpose of solicit- 
ing business or pecuniary gain while allowing the release of the same 
records to others.220 Concluding that the statute only disadvantaged 
commercial speech, the court stated that its “review is conducted subject 
to the lesser First Amendment protection afforded such speech.”221 
 
listeners from truthful, nonmisleading information was “incompatible with the First Amendment.” Id. 
at 577. 
214. Id. at 566. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kagan and Ginsburg, dissented on the applica- 
tion of a heightened standard of scrutiny to what he considered to be merely economic regulation that 
had only an incidental effect on speech. Id. at 585 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
215. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 
VT. L. REV. 855, 858 (2012) (“[In Sorrell,] the Court blurred the distinction between strict and inter- 
mediate scrutiny; a blurring that suggests a willingness (at least among the six Justices in the majority) 
to reconsider the treatment of commercial speech as a category of lower-value, less-protected 
speech.”); Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for Con- 
tent-Based Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1186 (2013) (“This near- 
convergence [in Sorrell] can be detected not only in the Court’s intolerance of restrictions on truthful, 
nonmisleading commercial speech, but also in the pronouncements that accompany these decisions.”). 
216. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 215, at 858 (“[In Sorrell,] the Court stringently applied the 
Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test, an approach consistent with other recent decisions.”); Stern 
& Stern, supra note 215, at 1186 (“[Sorrell] highlights a central theme of the Court’s commercial 
speech jurisprudence: the narrowing gap between the principles that govern fully protected speech and 
those peculiar to commercial expression.”). 
217. See generally supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
218. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 561 (noting that several of the petitioners were, in the Court’s words, 
“Vermont data miners”); L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999) 
(“United Reporting Publishing Corporation . . . is a private publishing service that provides the names 
and addresses of recently arrested individuals to its customers, who include attorneys, insurance com- 
panies, drug and alcohol counselors, and driving schools.”). 
219. See Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State of Colo., 21 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994). 
220. Id. at 1510 n.1 (defining “criminal justice records” to include all papers and other documen- 
tary materials that are made, maintained, or kept by any criminal justice agency, including any court 
with criminal jurisdiction, for use in the exercise of functions required or authorized by law). 
221.  Id. at 1513–14. 
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Applying the test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission,222 the Tenth Circuit found that Colorado had 
a “substantial interest” in protecting the privacy of those charged with 
misdemeanor traffic offenses and DUIs.223 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit 
had to navigate around the Supreme Court’s decision in Shapero v. Ken- 
tucky Bar Association, where the Court held that recipients of direct-mail 
solicitations did not have a privacy interest in avoiding attorney solicita- 
tions.224 The Tenth Circuit distinguished Shapero on the grounds that the 
Colorado statute protected the privacy interests of its citizens by prevent- 
ing lawyers from snooping around in citizens’ legal affairs, regardless of 
whether the lawyers sent solicitations.225 
The Colorado statute, however, did not prohibit anyone else from 
accessing the information or restrict the media from reporting the charg- 
es, which seems to undercut the state’s assertion that its goal in passing 
the statute was to protect the privacy of those charged with traffic viola- 
tions or DUIs.226 Conceding that this might make the state’s asserted pri- 
vacy interest “chimerical,” the Tenth Circuit reasoned that: 
[E]ven if the information is available to some degree through other 
sources, the state’s interest in not aiding in the dissemination of the 
information for commercial purposes remains. We presume that 
plaintiffs would not be involved in this litigation if the information 
they seek is so widely available that the privacy of the accused is no 
longer at issue. Thus, in this case we agree with the State that priva- 
cy considerations constitute a substantial state interest.227 
The Tenth Circuit is undoubtedly correct that the Colorado statute 
will reduce, at least in some instances, the dissemination of the targeted 
information. It is not clear, however, how the commercial uses restricted 
by the statute are sufficiently different from the permitted uses. If the ar- 
gument is that state restrictions on access to information always directly 
advance a substantial interest in privacy simply because they limit public 
disclosure in some incremental way, such an approach would vindicate 
every restriction on access to information. The Supreme Court’s appar- 
ent rejection of this argument in Sorrell indicates that commercial speech 
 
 
222.  447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
223. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1516. The Tenth Circuit also concluded that the statute 
“advance[d] the State’s interests in a reasonably direct way” and that it was no more extensive than 
necessary to serve the state’s interest. Id. at 1515. 
224. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). This aspect of the Court’s decision in Shapero appears to have been 
called into question by Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., where the Court held that the state has a “sub- 
stantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones 
against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers.” 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995). 
225. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1514 (“Solicitors are attempting to discover individuals’ 
legal affairs where such discovery might be most offensive—where it is by those whose purpose it is to 
use the information for pecuniary gain.”). 
226. The dissent made this very point. See id. at 1518 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“The State’s inter- 
est in preserving the right of privacy of those arrested for driving under the influence is not so compel- 
ling that they have attempted to prohibit the publication of the names of these individuals in the El 
Paso County News.”) 
227.  Id. at 1514. 
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restrictions must be based on something more in to justify the re- 
strictions.228 
Proponents of commercial speech restrictions thus face a catch-22: 
in order to avoid strict scrutiny they must target only commercial uses of 
information, but by limiting only a subset of uses (i.e., particular com- 
mercial uses of the information), they are left open to the argument that 
the restrictions are ineffective in advancing privacy interests. The argu- 
ment for limiting commercial uses of court information thus turns on 
whether the restricted commercial uses cause greater privacy harms than 
the unrestricted uses. How the courts resolve this inherent tension in the 
commercial-speech doctrine will likely have a significant impact on 
whether commercial uses of court records can be restricted. 
In summary, although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed 
the question of whether courts may limit who can access court records, 
the weight of authority supports the conclusion that the First Amend- 
ment requires courts to provide access to court records on an equal basis 
to all who request them. Unless a court can show a compelling reason for 
doing so, it cannot discriminate between members of the public when it 
comes to accessing court records. The courts may have more discretion, 
however, to limit commercial uses of court records—the Supreme Court 
generally subjects such restrictions to a lower standard of scrutiny. Nev- 
ertheless, privacy proponents will need to show that the commercial uses 
they target have a more detrimental effect on privacy than non- 
commercial uses. 
 
B. Limits on What Records Are Accessible to the Public 
While the courts have not been active in limiting who can access 
court records, they—as well as many legislatures—have been much more 
assertive in imposing restrictions on what the public can access. This sec- 
tion begins by examining which records are subject to a right of access 
under the First Amendment and then considers the types of records and 
information the courts can justifiably exclude from public inspection. 
 
1. The First Amendment’s Reach 
A court’s file for a single case may consist of thousands of docu- 
ments, including motions, pleadings, briefs, transcripts, exhibits entered 
into evidence, and materials produced during pre-trial discovery that 
have been filed with the court. In addition, judges have their own files, as 
do other court personnel, they use for court administration and other 
nonadjudicatory purposes. Given the wide range of records possessed by 
 
 
228. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011) (concluding that Vermont’s interest 
in preserving the confidentiality of prescriber-identifying information was not advanced by the statute 
because “[u]nder Vermont’s law, pharmacies may share prescriber-identifying information with any- 
one for any reason save one: They must not allow the information to be used for marketing”). 
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the courts, the public cannot have a right to inspect every document in 
the nation’s courthouses. 
In order to determine whether a First Amendment right of access 
attaches to a particular record, courts typically apply what is known as 
the “experience and logic” test.229 Under this two-part test, courts ask 
“whether the place and process have historically been open to the press 
and general public” (the “experience” prong) and “whether public access 
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular pro- 
cess in question” (the “logic” prong).230 If these criteria are met, a First 
Amendment right of access attaches to the proceeding or record in ques- 
tion, and access can be denied only if the justifications for closure with- 
stand strict scrutiny.231 Even if the experience and logic test is not satis- 
fied, a common law right of access can still attach to the record in 
question.232 
As the wording of the experience and logic test suggests, it was de- 
veloped in the context of court proceedings, not court records. As a 
threshold test for determining whether a First Amendment right of ac- 
cess attaches to a specific court record, the experience and logic test has 
proven to be a poor fit. First, the lower courts exhibit a great deal of con- 
fusion with regard to how to actually apply the test to court records. For 
example, some courts ask whether the judicial proceeding the record is 
associated with passes the experience and logic test,233 while other courts 
apply the test to the court record itself.234 In fact, several federal circuits 
cannot seem to make up their minds and apply both approaches.235 Be- 
cause of the different approaches courts take regarding the experience 
and logic test, it is possible for a court proceeding to be subject to a First 
Amendment right of access—with the attendant requirement that re- 
strictions on public access must pass strict scrutiny—while the documents 
associated with that proceeding would not be subject to a constitutional 
right of access.236 Of course, the converse situation, in which a court ap- 
 
229. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 (1986). 
230. Id. at 8 (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605). 
231. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510 (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606–07). 
232. See Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
233. See, e.g., United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1358–60 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Hal- 
ler, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Applications of NBC, 828 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1987); In re 
Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389–90 (4th Cir. 1986). 
234. See, e.g., Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Oregonian Publ’g Co. v. 
U.S. Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 229 (7th 
Cir. 1989); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th 
Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111–12 (3d Cir. 1985); Associated Press v. United 
States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983). 
235. Compare Antar, 38 F.3d at 1359–60 (applying experience and logic test to court records), 
with United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111–12 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying experience and logic test 
to proceeding associated with records), and Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 92–96 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (applying experience and logic test to court dockets), and In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 
110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying experience and logic test to proceeding associated with records). 
236. See, e.g., United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228–29 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding only a com- 
mon-law right of access to pre-trial sentence reports despite the First Amendment right of access to 
criminal proceedings); United States v. Gotti, 322 F. Supp. 2d 230, 249-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (recogniz- 
ing First Amendment right of access to sentencing hearing but finding no right of access to presen- 
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plies a First Amendment right of access to the documents but not to the 
proceeding itself, can occur as well.237 This can lead to some anomalous 
results that substantially undermine the public’s ability to understand the 
work of the courts. 
Second, and more fundamentally, the experience and logic test is 
out of step with the Supreme Court’s reasoning for granting a First 
Amendment right of access to the courts in the first place.238 By focusing 
on “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the function- 
ing of the particular process in question,”239 the test leaves the impression 
that the First Amendment right of access rests solely on the role that 
public access plays in improving the outcomes in individual cases. Yet it 
makes little sense to base a First Amendment right of access on the bene- 
fits that public access provides to specific court proceedings.240 While a 
just and effective court system is undoubtedly an important public good, 
it is not a core First Amendment value.241 Public access to the courts 
takes on First Amendment significance because it makes self- 
government possible.242 As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, 
“[u]nderlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the 
common understanding that ‘a major purpose of that Amendment was to 
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,’” and “to the extent 
that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it 
is to ensure that this constitutionally protected ‘discussion of governmen- 
tal affairs’ is an informed one.”243 
As I have argued elsewhere, the experience and logic test should be 
abandoned and replaced with a test that focuses on whether the records 
at issue are material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power in a 
 
tence letters sent directly to the court); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933, 938–39 
(Tex. App. 1986) (noting that, even if a First Amendment right of access applies to civil trials, the 
“limited” common-law access right to the judicial records meant that the records could be sealed at the 
court’s discretion), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987). 
237. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 
573 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding no First Amendment right of access to search warrant proceedings but 
nevertheless determining that a First Amendment right attaches to documents filed in support of 
search warrants); Edwards, 823 F.2d at 117-19 (finding no First Amendment right of access to mid-trial 
questioning of jurors regarding potential misconduct, but holding that a right of access attached to the 
transcript of the hearing); United States v. Koubriti, 252 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (hold- 
ing that closure of voir dire in terrorism trial did not violate First Amendment right of access so long as 
transcript  was released). 
238. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 861–71. 
239. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added). 
240. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 894. 
241. Justice Stevens remarked on this very point in his concurrence in Press-Enterprise I: 
The focus commanded by the First Amendment makes it appropriate to emphasize the fact that 
the underpinning of our holding today is not simply the interest in effective judicial administra- 
tion; the First Amendment’s concerns are much broader. The “common core purpose of assuring 
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government,” that underlies 
the decision of cases of this kind provides protection to all members of the public “from abridg- 
ment of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including 
the Judicial Branch.” 464 U.S. at 517 (internal citations omitted). 
242. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 900–02. 
243. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604–05 (1982) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 
218 (1966)). 
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particular case.244 Such a test is better aligned with the justifications for 
recognizing a First Amendment right of access in the first place and is 
more workable than the experience and logic test.245 Indeed, assessing the 
materiality of information is something that judges are well suited to 
do.246 
It is important to note that court records can be material even when 
they do not relate to a dispositive issue before the court.247 In Center for 
Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, for example, the Ninth Circuit warned 
that such a narrow approach to determining whether a right of access ex- 
ists “would not include [records associated with] motions that go to the 
heart of a case, such as a motion for preliminary injunction or a motion 
in limine.”248 The court went on to explain: 
Most litigation in a case is not literally “dispositive,” but neverthe- 
less involves important issues and information to which our case law 
demands the public should have access. To only apply the compel- 
ling reasons test to the narrow category of “dispositive motions” 
goes against the long held interest “in ensuring the public’s under- 
standing of the judicial process and of significant public events.” 
Such a reading also contradicts our precedent, which presumes that 
the “‘compelling reasons’ standard applies to most judicial rec- 
ords.”249 
Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the better test is whether the records 
are “more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action.”250 
As the court noted, “plenty of technically nondispositive motions— 
including routine motions in limine—are strongly correlative to the mer- 
its of a case.”251 
 
 
244. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 907. Records should be considered to be 
material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power whenever they are relevant to the core judicial 
function of determining the facts and the law applicable to the case. Id. at 907 n.401. 
245.  See id. at 907–09. 
246. Judges assess materiality in a wide range of contexts, including securities regulation and per- 
jury. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW 
OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12 (4th ed. 2002). In fact, courts already engage in such assessments 
when determining whether a common law right of access attaches to particular court records. See FTC 
v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that personal financial 
statements submitted by the defendant as part of the trial court’s approval of a proposed consent de- 
cree were subject to a common-law presumption of public access because they were records on which 
the trial court “relie[d] in determining the litigants’ substantive rights”); see also In re Cendant Corp., 
260 F. 3d 183, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2001); Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 
1312 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1995). 
247. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2013); Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 
1245–46 (11th Cir. 2007); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
248. 809 F.3d at 1098. 
249. Id. (emphasis in original) (first quoting Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 
1179 (9th Cir. 2006); then quoting Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
250.  Id. at 1099. 
251. Id. (internal citations omitted). The court noted that “a motion in limine to admit statements 
in furtherance of a conspiracy under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) will often spell out the 
very conspiracy alleged in a civil RICO complaint.” Id. at 1099 n.5. 
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In many situations, replacing the experience and logic test with a 
materiality test will not result in a dramatic expansion of the First 
Amendment right of access.252 Courts already recognize a First Amend- 
ment right of access to nearly all records associated with criminal trials253 
as well as to a wide range of records submitted in connection with other 
types of criminal proceedings, including records related to judicial dis- 
qualification,254 conflicts of interest,255 disqualification of defense coun- 
sel,256 and competency hearings.257 
The change will be more significant for records in civil cases, but 
many courts already apply a First Amendment right of access to civil 
records.258 Utilizing the same reasoning seen in criminal cases, courts ap- 
ply a First Amendment right of access to records in civil cases because 
they recognize that the public cannot fully understand the actions of the 
courts without having contemporaneous access to the records. In News- 
day LLC v. County of Nassau, for example, the Second Circuit remarked 
that “[t]he transcript of a proceeding is so closely related to the ability to 
attend the proceeding itself that maintaining secrecy is appropriate only 
if closing the courtroom was appropriate.”259 “Based on this logic,” the 
Second Circuit wrote, “we have held that the First Amendment right ap- 
plies, among other things, to summary judgment motions and documents 
relied upon in adjudicating them, pretrial motions and written documents 
submitted in connection with them, and docket sheets.”260 
The presumption of public access would not extend, however, to un- 
filed discovery material or to records that are not material to a court’s 
exercise of its adjudicatory functions in a particular case.261 These records 
 
252. This is the approach taken by the American Bar Association, which has promulgated stand- 
ards recommending that there should be a public right of access to “all judicial proceedings, related 
documents and exhibits, and any record made thereof,” subject to specific, narrowly defined circum- 
stances. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE 8-5.2 
(2013). In the commentary to an earlier version of the standards, the ABA stated that its position was 
intended to conform to the Supreme Court’s recognition in Richmond Newspapers of a First Amend- 
ment-based right of access premised on the “structural design of the Constitution to guarantee a self- 
informed citizenry.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 8-3.2, 
23 (3d ed. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). 
253. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
254. See In re Storer Commc’ns, Inc., 828 F.2d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Application of NBC, 
Inc., 828 F.2d 340, 343–44 (6th Cir. 1987). 
255. See In re Applications of NBC, Inc., 828 F.2d at 345. 
256. See United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1151, 1167–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
257. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Chappell, 403 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. App. 1981); Louisiana v. 
Eaton, 483 So. 2d 651, 662 (La. App. 1986); Express News Corp. v. MacRae, 787 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1990); Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1177–80 (Utah 1987); In re 
Times-World Corp., 488 S.E.2d 677, 684 (Va. App. 1997). 
258. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
259. 730 F.3d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 272 (4th Cir. 
2014) (“Because the public benefits attendant with open proceedings are compromised by delayed 
disclosure of documents, we take this opportunity to underscore the caution of our precedent and em- 
phasize that the public and press generally have a contemporaneous right of access to court documents 
and proceedings when the right applies.”). 
260. Newsday L.L.C., 730 F.3d at 164 (internal citations omitted). 
261. Unfiled settlement materials and documents related to fees and expenses, such as filings un- 
der the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”), also would not be covered. See United States v. Gonzales, 150 
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would continue to be subject only to a “good cause” standard for seal- 
ing.262 Pretrial discovery that is simply exchanged between the parties, for 
example, is not considered a public component of litigation.263 Neverthe- 
less, once discovery materials have been filed with the court, a First 
Amendment right of access should attach if the records are material to 
the court’s adjudication of the parties’ claims.264 Thus, as a leading trea- 
tise on litigation warns, even records “designated as confidential under a 
protective order . . . will lose confidential status (absent a showing of 
‘most compelling’ reasons) if introduced at trial or filed in connection 
with a motion for summary judgment.”265 
 
2. Evaluating Privacy Interests 
As noted previously, the public’s right to inspect court records is not 
absolute.266 The First Amendment right of access can be overcome when 
the countervailing interests supporting secrecy are sufficiently compel- 
ling. The question is whether restrictions on public access to court rec- 
ords that are premised on the protection of privacy can survive strict 
scrutiny. Although the question of whether a specific interest will justify 
restrictions on public access cannot be answered in the abstract, it is clear 
from the case law that personal privacy can be a compelling interest in 
certain situations. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that the 
state has a compelling interest in preserving the privacy of minors who 
testify about the details of sex crimes,267 and in protecting the privacy of 
jurors who are questioned about deeply personal matters.268 Lower courts 
have found an even broader range of interests to be compelling, includ- 
ing the privacy interests of juveniles in the disclosure of physical and 
 
 
 
F.3d 1246, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the CJA voucher process is handled by the Adminis- 
trative Office of the United States Courts and that “the court essentially acts in an administrative, not 
a judicial, capacity when approving voucher requests and related motions for trial assistance”). 
262. The “good cause” language comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the issuance of protec- 
tive orders in the discovery process: “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party 
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(c). 
263. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (“[P]retrial depositions and 
interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial . . . and, in general, they are conducted in pri- 
vate as a matter of modern practice.”). 
264. See, e.g., Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Burk, 504 So. 2d 378, 383–84 (Fla. 1987) (“[O]nce a 
transcribed deposition is filed with the court . . . it is open to public inspection,” but “there is no first 
amendment right of public access to criminal deposition proceedings or to unfiled depositions in crim- 
inal prosecutions.”). 
265. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, §11.432, at *3 (4th ed. 2004), 
2004 WL 258619. 
266. See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text. 
267. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607 (“We agree with appellee that the first interest— 
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor—is a compelling one.”). 
268. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511 (“The jury selection process may, in some circum- 
stances, give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply 
personal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain.”). 
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mental health information,269 of a rape victim’s sexual conduct before and 
after his or her encounter with the defendant,270 of third parties identified 
in a “psychosexual evaluation” of a criminal defendant,271 of women who 
have had sexual relationships with a government official who was 
charged with corruption,272 and of jurors who were questioned regarding 
potential  misconduct.273 
The Supreme Court has, however, been skeptical of the govern- 
ment’s use of privacy as a Trojan horse for other purposes aimed at limit- 
ing the impact of speech.274 In Sorrell v. IMS Health, for example, the 
Court wrote that the state “[a]ll but conced[es] that [the statute restrict- 
ing access to prescription information] does not in itself advance confi- 
dentiality interests,”275 and remarked that the state fell back on other in- 
terests to support the statute, such as lowering the cost of healthcare and 
reducing the influence of drug manufacturers.276 As Ashutosh Bhagwat 
notes, “such ancillary interests often will turn out after further considera- 
tion, as in Sorrell, to be nothing more than efforts to suppress speech be- 
cause of its potentially persuasive effect; an interest the Court has re- 
peatedly labeled illegitimate.”277 When privacy is protected for its own 
sake, however, restrictions on public access are less likely to cross the 
line into what the Court calls the “highly paternalistic approach” of sup- 
pressing speech because of its effects on listeners.278 
But it should be remembered that not only must the interest in pri- 
vacy be compelling; the means chosen to advance that interest must also 
be narrowly tailored and effective in advancing the state’s interest. In 
 
269. See United States v. Brice, 649 F.3d 793, 796–97 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding trial court’s clo- 
sure of material witness proceedings where public access would reveal “private and painful” infor- 
mation related to then-juvenile victims’ physical and mental health). 
270. See People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 635–36 (Colo. 2004) (restricting access to the transcript of 
proceedings addressing the prior and subsequent sexual conduct of a rape victim). 
271. See State v. Densmore, 624 A.2d 1138, 1143–44 (Vt. 1993) (rejecting wholesale closure of the 
document but noting that “the privacy rights of victims may be sufficient to require redaction of por- 
tions of the document”). 
272. See United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93 (VEC), 2016 WL 1572993, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 
2016). 
273. See Ex parte Greenville News, 482 S.E.2d 556, 558 (S.C. 1997) (post-trial allegations of juror 
misconduct during murder trial must be publicly disclosed, but jurors’ names and identifying infor- 
mation could be redacted to preserve juror privacy because the “conduct occurred during the jurors’ 
personal time while sequestered and did not involve their function as jurors”). 
274. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 573 (2011). 
275. Id. at 573; see also id. at 572 (“It may be assumed that, for many reasons, physicians have an 
interest in keeping their prescription decisions confidential. But § 4631(d) is not drawn to serve that 
interest. Under Vermont’s law, pharmacies may share prescriber-identifying information with anyone 
for any reason save one: They must not allow the information to be used for marketing.”) 
276.  Id. at 575–76. 
277. Bhagwat, supra note 215, at 871; see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 
374–75 (2002) (holding that reducing the persuasive impact of drug advertisements is not a legitimate 
governmental interest justifying speech restrictions). 
278. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 375; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 
484, 503 (1996) (“[B]ans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech . . . usually rest solely on 
the offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth. The First Amendment 
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the 
government perceives to be their own good.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis removed). 
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Press-Enterprise I, for example, the trial judge stated that it was closing 
the voir dire proceedings to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
and the prospective jurors’ right to privacy.279 The Supreme Court re- 
marked that “[t]he jury selection process may, in some circumstances, 
give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interroga- 
tion touches on deeply personal matters that person has legitimate rea- 
sons for keeping out of the public domain,”280 but nevertheless concluded 
that the trial court’s closure was improper because it was “unsupported 
by findings showing that an open proceeding in fact threatened those in- 
terests.”281 
 
3. Categorical Exclusions 
With such a clear directive from the Supreme Court that restrictions 
on public access must be preceded by on-the-record findings demonstrat- 
ing that they are necessary to advance a compelling state interest, it is 
surprising that many scholars argue for categorical exemptions from pub- 
lic access,282 and that a number of statutes and court rules declare some 
types of proceedings (e.g., juvenile, child abuse, and divorce proceedings) 
be closed to the public283 and certain types of information (e.g., social se- 
curity numbers, dates of birth, financial account numbers and names of 
minor children) be presumptively excluded from public access.284 
Categorical exclusions such as these raise a number of concerns. 
First, they are incompatible with the presumption of public access re- 
quired by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly in- 
structed that “individualized determinations are always required before 
the right of access may be denied.”285 Although the protection of privacy 
can be a compelling state interest that justifies restrictions on court ac- 
cess, the Court has warned that closures “must be rare”286 and that judges 
 
279. 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984). 
280.   Id. at 511. 
281.  Id. at 510–11. 
282. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 36, at 118 (arguing that courts should redact all social security 
numbers and other personal information that could facilitate identity theft or financial fraud); Natalie 
Gomez-Velez, Internet Access to Court Records – Balancing  Public  Access  and  Privacy,  51  LOY. L. 
REV. 365, 429 (2005) (recommending that courts remove from public view high-risk data elements); 
Kristin A. Henderson, Lessons from Bankruptcy Court Public Records: A Conflict of Values for Law 
Librarians, 23 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 55, 73, 76–77 (2004) (proposing redaction of information 
from bankruptcy court records); Laura W. Morgan, Strengthening the Lock on the Bedroom Door: The 
Case Against Access to Divorce Records Online, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 45, 51, 63 (2001) 
(arguing that divorce records should be presumptively private); Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Ac- 
countability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a  New  Role  for  Internet  Access  to  Court  Rec-  
ords, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 969–78 (2009) (recommending redaction of names of cooperating defend- 
ants and other informants). 
283. See infra notes 291–302 and accompanying text. 
284. See infra notes 335–340 and accompanying text. 
285. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 608 n.20 (1982); see also, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 
F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992); Wash. 
Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Applications of NBC, Inc. v. Presser, 828 F.2d 
340, 346 (6th Cir. 1987). 
286. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509. 
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must “determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary.”287 
The Court explained that “[s]uch an approach ensures that the constitu- 
tional right of [access] will not be restricted except where necessary to 
protect the State’s interest.”288 
Second, categorical exclusions are constitutionally problematic be- 
cause they foreclose judges from considering other options to protect 
privacy, short of closure or sealing. As with other First Amendment 
rights, a court must consider all reasonable alternatives before imposing 
restrictions on public access. In Presley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court’s 
most recent pronouncement on public access to criminal proceedings, the 
Court instructed that “trial courts are required to consider alternatives to 
closure even when they are not offered by the parties.”289 As the Court 
noted, “[t]he public has a right to be present whether or not any party 
has asserted the right.”290 
a. Case Exclusions 
Nevertheless, some court proceedings and records are categorically 
closed to the public. For example, many states have statutes that restrict 
public access to records in cases that involve certain types of legal mat- 
ters, including adoption, child abuse, guardianship, juvenile, and divorce 
proceedings.291 Moreover, in every state, as well as in the federal court 
system, grand jury proceedings are conducted under strict rules of secre- 
cy.292 
Juvenile court proceedings provide an instructive example of the 
problems that arise from the categorical closure of court proceedings and 
records. Each state has special courts—often called juvenile courts—that 
have jurisdiction over cases involving children under a specified age.293 
 
287. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 609–10 (finding that the state’s interests in protecting the 
privacy of minor sexual assault victims was compelling but holding that a statute that required manda- 
tory closure was not the least restrictive means of advancing that interest); see also Press-Enterprise I, 
464 U.S. at 513 (invalidating closure of jury voir dire and stating “not only was there a failure to articu- 
late findings with the requisite specificity but there was also a failure to consider alternatives to closure 
and to total suppression of the transcript”). 
288. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 609. 
289. 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (holding that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
was violated when the trial court excluded the public from the voir dire of prospective jurors) (per cu- 
riam). 
290. Id. 
291. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-133 (2012) (restricting public access to juvenile court records); 
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2.420(d)(1)(B) (2016) (prohibiting access to records in juvenile and adop- 
tion proceedings); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.340 (West 2016) (making all juvenile court records con- 
fidential unless otherwise ordered); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 16-906 (West 2016) (listing 
categories of cases in which court records are not publicly accessible in Maryland, including adoption, 
guardianship, child abuse, and attorney grievance matters); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-2-1323 (2016) 
(sealing records of supervision proceedings by the insurance commissioner); id. § 41-3-205 (sealing 
records of child abuse and neglect proceedings); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney 2016) 
(sealing records in criminal cases decided in favor of the accused). 
292. See, e.g., In re N.Y. Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401, 
410 n.4 (2d Cir. 2009) (“All grand jury proceedings . . . traditionally have been nonpublic.”). 
293. See Juvenile Court, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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Juvenile courts hear a range of claims, including criminal charges against 
minors (typically referred to as “juvenile delinquency” proceedings)294 
and allegations of abuse, abandonment, and neglect (“juvenile depend- 
ency” proceedings).295 Although the experience of juveniles in delinquen- 
cy proceedings often mirrors adult criminal defendants,296 juvenile court 
proceedings are considered to be civil as opposed to criminal because 
treatment and rehabilitation are the primary goals, not punishment.297 
Juvenile court proceedings, therefore, fall in the gray area between the 
Supreme Court’s precedents addressing a right of access to criminal pro- 
ceedings and the less well-developed right of access to civil proceedings 
that has been recognized by many lower courts.298 
As a result of the uncertainty over whether the First Amendment 
right of access reaches juvenile proceedings, a number of states have 
statutes that impose full or partial bans on public access to juvenile pro- 
ceedings and records.299 In fact, many of these statutes leave judges with 
no discretion to allow public access, even if they feel that public access is 
warranted or that it is in the juvenile’s best interests. In Vermont, for ex- 
ample, the state’s supreme court has held that its juvenile shield law re- 
quires the mandatory closure of all juvenile court proceedings.300 Similar- 
ly, in Kentucky the public is excluded from both juvenile dependency 
and delinquency proceedings,301 and the records associated with those 
proceedings are considered to be confidential and may be disclosed only 
to certain individuals and agencies designated by statute.302 
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the blanket closure 
of juvenile proceedings, there are reasons to doubt the constitutionality 
of their per se closure. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the 
Court did consider whether the First Amendment permits a statutory bar 
to public access to criminal trials during the testimony of minor victims of 
sex crimes.303 The appellee argued that the statute served two compelling 
state interests: “the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from fur- 
 
294. See Juvenile Delinquency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
295. See Shelter Hearing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
296. See generally Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a 
Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57 (1992). 
297. Id. at 59–60; see also United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1358 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[P]roceedings 
to determine whether a juvenile is a delinquent are not generally regarded as criminal proceedings.”). 
298. See New Jersey ex rel. K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) (“[T]he United States 
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey have yet to decide whether this [First Amend- 
ment] right extends to juvenile proceedings.”); In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1127 (Vt. 1981) (“[J]uvenile 
proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, a fact which makes at least some of the First Amendment 
purposes served by open criminal trials inapplicable.”). 
299. See KRISTEN RASMUSSEN, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ACCESS TO 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 4–5 (2012), http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/SJAJJ.pdf (listing states that re- 
strict public access to juvenile proceedings and records). 
300. See In re J. S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Vt. 1981) (“The juvenile shield law does not give the 
court below discretion to make the proceedings public.”). The court’s holding was limited to proceed- 
ings already in juvenile court; proceedings prior to transfer to juvenile court are presumptively open in 
Vermont. See In re K.F., 559 A.2d 663 (Vt. 1989). 
301. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070 (West 2017). 
302.  See id. § 610.340. 
303.  457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
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ther trauma and embarrassment; and the encouragement of such victims 
to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner.”304 The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that both of these interests were compel- 
ling, but it held that neither would justify an across-the-board ban on ac- 
cess in every case involving a minor: 
[A]s compelling as that interest [in protecting minor victims of sex 
crimes] is, it does not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear 
that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the signifi- 
cance of the interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case 
basis whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor 
victim. Among the factors to be weighed are the minor victim’s age, 
psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, 
and desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives. 
[The Massachusetts statute], in contrast, requires closure even if the 
victim does not seek the exclusion of the press and general public, 
and would not suffer injury by their presence.305 
In addition to articulating specific findings justifying restrictions on 
public access, a court must conclude that there are no less-restrictive al- 
ternatives to closure available.306 Because mandatory bans on public ac- 
cess foreclose this inquiry, they are also constitutionally suspect. As the 
Court observed in Globe Newspaper: 
If the trial court had been permitted to exercise its discretion, clo- 
sure might well have been deemed unnecessary. In short, [the stat- 
ute] cannot be viewed as a narrowly tailored means of accommodat- 
ing the State’s asserted interest: That interest could be served just as 
well by requiring the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis 
whether the State’s legitimate concern for the well-being of the mi- 
nor victim necessitates closure. Such an approach ensures that the 
constitutional right of the press and the public to gain access to 
criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary to pro- 
tect the State’s interest.307 
This is not to say that all proceedings and information regarding ju- 
veniles must be open to public inspection. The Court noted in Globe 
Newspaper that protecting the privacy of minors can be a compelling 
state interest: “In individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, 
the First Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion 
from the courtroom of the press and general public during the testimony 
of minor sex-offense victims.”308 Indeed, lower courts have held that the 
privacy interests of minors are compelling and can justify the closure of 
 
 
 
304.   Id. at 607. 
305. Id. at 608 (emphasis in original). 
306. Id. at 608-09; see also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 513 (invalidating closure of jury voir dire 
and stating “not only was there a failure to articulate findings with the requisite specificity but there 
was also a failure to consider alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the transcript”). 
307. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607–08. 
308.  Id. at 611 n.27. 
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court proceedings and the sealing of court records.309 But, as the Court 
held in Globe Newspaper, “a mandatory rule, requiring no particularized 
determinations in individual cases, is unconstitutional.”310 
Based in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in Globe Newspaper, 
a number of courts have questioned whether the First Amendment per- 
mits the blanket closure of juvenile proceedings.311 In In re Chase, for ex- 
ample, the New York Family Court held that the public has a First 
Amendment right of access to juvenile proceedings,312 explaining that 
public access to juvenile proceedings is especially important because it 
can enhance the integrity of the proceedings and deter abuse of the judi- 
cial process.313 In United States v. A.D., the Third Circuit rejected the 
government’s argument that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act314 re- 
quires closed proceedings and records.315 Although the court declined to 
rule on the question of whether a mandatory closure rule would violate 
the First Amendment, it remarked that it was difficult to reconcile a 
mandatory rule of closure with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Globe 
Newspaper and intimated that, in the appropriate case, it too would find 
a presumptive right of public access to juvenile delinquency hearings.316 
In order to avoid “serious First Amendment concerns,” the court held 
that the statute did not impose a mandatory ban on public access, stating: 
“in the absence of an unambiguous directive to the contrary, we are re- 
luctant to attribute to Congress an intention to deprive district courts of 
discretion to strike on a case-by-case basis the balance between the in- 
terests protected by the First Amendment and competing privacy inter- 
ests” in juvenile delinquency cases.317 
Lest we think that invalidating the blanket closure of juvenile pro- 
ceedings will throw the juvenile justice system into disarray, it is im- 
 
309. See, e.g., United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 1995); Webster Groves Sch. 
Dist. v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 898 F.2d 1371, 1375 (8th Cir. 1990); M.P. v. Schwartz, 853 F. Supp. 164, 167 
(D. Md. 1994); Bell v. Shinseki, No. 1:12CV57, 2013 WL 3157569, at *9–10 (M.D.N.C. June 20, 2013); 
Wittenberg ex rel. J.W. v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Educ., Civil Action No. 1:05cv00818, 
2009 WL 1684585, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 16, 2009); Mears v. Atl. Se. Airlines, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-613-F, 
2014 WL 5018907, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2014); In re J.B., 39 A.3d 421, 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
310. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 611 n.27; cf. State v. Parvin, 364 P.3d 94, 106–10 (Wash. 
2015) (finding that a blanket sealing of documents in all parental termination cases violated the Wash- 
ington Constitution and requiring case-by-case analysis). 
311. See, e.g., Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 90; United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1356 (3d Cir. 
1994); In re Chase, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1001–04 (Fam. Ct. 1982); In re M.B., 819 A.2d 59, 60 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2003). 
312. Chase, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (“[T]he historical and analytical bases for the public right of 
access in criminal trials pertain equally to civil proceedings. Those grounds reflect a profound Anglo- 
American commitment to open justice in criminal and civil proceedings.”). 
313.  Id. at 1008. 
314. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–5042 (2012). 
315. A.D., 28 F.3d at 1356. 
316. See id. at 1358; accord Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 90 (“Assuming arguendo that the First 
Amendment right of public access does apply to some degree to juvenile proceedings, we agree that 
while the Globe case is not directly applicable here, the Court’s reasoning in that case strongly sug- 
gests that the district court’s preferred [mandatory] reading of the Act raises some serious First 
Amendment concerns.”). 
317. A.D., 28 F.3d at 1359. 
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portant to consider that thirty-eight states already recognize a right of ac- 
cess to juvenile delinquency proceedings, based on either the First 
Amendment318 or a mix of state constitutional, common law, and statuto- 
ry authority.319 Nineteen states currently grant a right of access to juvenile 
dependency proceedings.320 
Moreover, courts must already engage in case-specific evaluations 
before restricting public access in civil and criminal cases and such a sys- 
tem has proven to be workable for the courts in those cases. 
There are also strong normative reasons to reject a mandatory bar 
to public access in juvenile cases. Even though minors have long been 
treated differently than adults, both to protect their privacy and to pro- 
mote society’s interest in rehabilitation,321 some commentators have 
pushed back against the lack of public access to juvenile proceedings, ar- 
guing that additional public oversight would improve the functioning of 
the juvenile court system and allow the public to evaluate society’s ap- 
proach to juvenile justice issues.322 Laura Cohen, for example, writes: 
“[T]he system’s remarkable ability to escape public scrutiny has contrib- 
uted to widespread ignorance about the nature of youth crime and the 
shocking ineffectiveness of traditional responses to it. Rational system 
reform will only come about if the public becomes better informed and 
demands more of lawmakers.”323 The National Council of Juvenile and 
Family Court Judges has also taken the position that juvenile proceed- 
ings should generally be open to the public.324 These voices appear to be 
resonating with judges and legislators, and the trend in courts around the 
country is to allow greater public access to juvenile proceedings and their 
associated records.325 
It bears repeating that the First Amendment does not require courts 
to ignore the privacy interests of minors or anyone else. Even under the 
most expansive application of a First Amendment right of access, a court 
can still close its proceedings and restrict public access to sensitive infor- 
 
318. See RASMUSSEN, supra note 299, at 4–5 (listing states). 
319. See id. 
320. See id. 
321. See Emily Bazelon, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors 
Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 192–93 (1999). 
322. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imaging Childhood and  Reconstructing  the  Legal  Order:  
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1120–29 (1991); Bazelon, supra note 
321, at 192–93; Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 1, 54 (2001); Laura Cohen, Kids, Courts, and Cameras: New Challenges for Juvenile De- 
fenders, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 701, 702 (1999); Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts 
A Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 310 (2007); Jennifer L. Rosato, 
Secrecy and the Juvenile Justice System: The Future of Access to the Family Court: Beyond Naming and 
Blaming, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 149, 158 (2000). 
323. Cohen, supra note 322, at 702. 
324. See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES,  CHILDREN  AND  FAMILY 
FIRST: A MANDATE FOR AMERICA’S COURTS 3 (1995) (“Traditional notions of secrecy and confiden- 
tiality should be re-examined and relaxed to promote public confidence in the court’s work. The public 
has a right to know how courts deal with children and families.”). 
325. See Linda Szymanski, Can Sealed Juvenile Court Records Ever Be Unsealed or Inspected?, 15 
NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. SNAPSHOT (2011); Cohen, supra note 322, at 706–09. 
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mation in its records. What the First Amendment does require, however, 
is that each case be evaluated based on its specific facts in order to de- 
termine whether restrictions on public access are supported by a compel- 
ling interest and are narrowly tailored to advance that interest. As the 
Supreme Court observed in Globe Newspaper, “it is clear that the cir- 
cumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the inter- 
est.”326 Statutes and rules that mandate the closure of court proceedings 
and records foreclose this essential inquiry and are thus facially unconsti- 
tutional. 
What are we to make, then, of grand jury secrecy? Courts uniformly 
uphold restrictions on public access to grand jury proceedings, noting 
that secrecy is an integral part of the grand jury’s function.327 In fact, the 
Supreme Court remarked in dicta in Press-Enterprise II that grand jury 
proceedings should remain closed.328 Although the dissenters in Press- 
Enterprise II argued that the Court’s rationale for opening pretrial pro- 
ceedings based on the “logic” of openness would apply equally well to 
grand jury proceedings,329 the majority responded that the traditional se- 
crecy of grand jury proceedings served to advance the grand jury’s 
screening and investigatory functions.330 In contrast, the closure of pre- 
liminary hearings, the majority noted, is not done to serve the hearing’s 
functional objectives, but to protect other interests, such as the accused’s 
right to a fair trial.331 
Although the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II did not distin- 
guish grand jury proceedings from other types of criminal proceedings on 
the basis of the grand jury’s unique place in the criminal justice system, 
some courts have concluded that there is no First Amendment right of 
access to grand jury proceedings, not because of the inherent need for 
secrecy, but because grand jury proceedings are not instituted by the ju- 
diciary or governed by its rules.332 In United States v. Williams, the Su- 
 
326. 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982). 
327. See, e.g., United States v. Index Newspapers LLC, 766 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Be- 
cause the grand jury is an integral part of the criminal investigatory process, these proceedings are al- 
ways held in secret.”). The public does have a right of access to the “ministerial records” of a grand 
jury, which “generally relate to the procedural aspects of the impaneling and operation of the . . . 
Grand Jury, as opposed to records which relate to the substance of the . . . Grand Jury’s investigation.” 
In re Special Grand Jury, 674 F.2d 778, 779 n.1, 780 (9th Cir. 1982). 
328. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9 (“Although many governmental processes operate best 
under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of government 
operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly. A classic example is that ‘the proper 
functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.’”) (quoting 
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979)). 
329. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The obvious defect in the 
Court’s approach is that its reasoning applies to the traditionally secret grand jury with as much force 
as it applies to California preliminary hearings. A grand jury indictment is just as likely to be the ‘final 
step’ in a criminal proceeding and the ‘sole occasion’ for public scrutiny as is a preliminary hearing.”). 
330. Id. at 9 (“[T]he proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of 
grand jury proceedings.”) (quoting Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218). 
331. See LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23.1(d) (3d ed. 2000). 
332. See In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying request for public access 
and stating “the grand jury is not even a part of the judicial system”); In re Motion of Dow Jones & 
Co., 142 F.3d 496, 498–99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (refusing to grant a right of access to ancillary proceedings 
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preme Court remarked that the power to convene a grand jury is “not in 
the body of the Constitution.”333 As a result, the Court concluded that 
“[b]ecause the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over 
whose functioning the courts do not preside,” the courts have no “‘su- 
pervisory’ judicial authority” to prescribe standards of prosecutorial con- 
duct.334 Whether because grand juries operate outside of the auspices of 
the judicial branch or because secrecy is integral to a grand jury’s investi- 
gatory function, it is unlikely that the mandatory closure of grand jury 
proceedings will have to be rethought. 
 
b. Record- and Information-Based Exclusions 
Unlike the mandatory closure of entire cases, which occurs in a rela- 
tively small number of case types, legislatures and courts are increasingly 
drafting statutes and court rules that restrict public access to specific 
types of information and court records. These categorical exclusions op- 
erate at different levels of generality. Some statutes and court rules ex- 
clude from public inspection particular information types (e.g., social se- 
curity numbers, bank account numbers);335 some exclude designated in- 
information categories (e.g., juror information, witness information);336 
and some exclude entire classes of records (e.g., income tax returns, 
presentence reports).337 
For example, in California, a state statute requires a court, upon the 
request of a party to a divorce proceeding, to seal any records that con- 
tain the location or other identifying information regarding the financial 
assets and liabilities of the parties.338 In Colorado, statewide court rules 
identify twenty-four types of information and records that are excluded 
from public access, including genetic testing information, drug and alco- 
 
related to a grand jury investigation and noting that “[a]lthough the grand jury normally operates, of 
course, in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial 
Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length”) (quoting United States v. Williams, 504 
U.S. 36, 47 (1992)). 
333.  504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). 
334. Id. 
335. See, e.g., COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.60(e) (financial 
account numbers, social security numbers, driver license numbers, and other “personal identification 
numbers”); FL. R. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.420(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2016) (social security; bank ac- 
count; and charge, debit, and credit card numbers, among other kinds of records); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 403.135(3) (West 2016) (social security numbers, names of minor children, dates of birth, or 
financial account numbers in divorce or child custody proceedings); Md. R. § 16-907 (2016) (social 
security numbers and federal identification numbers). 
336. See, e.g., COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.60(d)(2) (genetic 
testing information); FL. R. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.420(d)(1)(B)(iv) (HIV testing information); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 729.7 (2016) (identifying witnesses in criminal trials); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-5- 
311(3) (2016) (information identifying the victim of certain sex crimes). 
337. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3552(c) (West 2016) (tax returns); COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, 
PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.60(d) (deposited wills, presentence reports, and separation 
agreements); FL. R. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.420(d)(1)(B) (presentence investigation reports, 
estate inventories and accountings, and forensic behavioral health evaluations); MD. R. § 16-1006 (tax 
returns, presentence reports, and autopsy reports); MONT CODE ANN. § 46-18-113 (2016) (presentence 
reports). 
338. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2024.6(a). 
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hol treatment information, paternity tests, HIV/AIDS testing infor- 
mation, juror questionnaires, credit reports, medical and mental health 
information, psychological and intelligence test information, and scholas- 
tic achievement data.339 And, in the Western District of North Carolina, a 
local rule prevents the public from seeing a defendant’s sentencing mem- 
orandum and letters of support from interested parties.340 While this is 
just a partial list, it reveals the wide range of categorical exclusions that 
can impact public access to court records. 
Although per se restrictions on public access to information held by 
the government might be permissible in situations where the public does 
not have a First Amendment right to access the underlying records, such 
as in the FOIA context, it is not permissible when applied to court rec- 
ords.341 Because the categorical exclusion of public access to information 
in court records shares the same deficiencies as the case-based closures 
described in the prior Section, a number of courts have held categorical 
exclusions to be unconstitutional.342 In Burkle v. Burkle, for example, a 
California court held that a state statute mandating the sealing of finan- 
cial records in divorce proceedings violated the public’s First Amend- 
ment right of access.343 In concluding that the statute at issue was “uncon- 
stitutional on its face,” the court wrote: 
The First Amendment provides a right of access to court records in 
divorce proceedings. While the privacy interests protected by [the 
statute] may override the First Amendment right of access in an 
appropriate case, the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve over- 
riding privacy interests. Because less restrictive means exist to 
achieve the statutory objective, [the statute] operates as an undue 
 
 
339. See COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.60(d). 
340. W.D.N.C. LOCAL R. OF CRIM. P. 32.3, 55.1(I); see also Jim Morrill & Fred Clasen-Kelly, No- 
table Allies Rallied Around David Petraeus, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 8, 2015), http:// 
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article23542822.html (“Legal experts said sen- 
tencing memorandums and letters are routinely made public in other federal court districts. They said 
they did not know any other jurisdictions in the country where the records are sealed without approval 
from a judge.”). 
341. See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text. 
342. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 510–11 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that 
“a blanket restriction on access to the records of cases ending in an acquittal, a dismissal, a nolle pros- 
equi, or a finding of no probable cause, is unconstitutional, even if access is not denied permanently”); 
Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1983) (invalidating the imposition of 
blanket sealing orders, which the court said “impermissibly reverse the ‘presumption of openness’ that 
characterizes criminal proceedings ‘under our system of justice’”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 
819 F.Supp. 89, 100 (D. Mass. 1993) (finding unconstitutional a statute restricting access to the court- 
maintained indices of criminal defendants); Burkle v. Burkle, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 808 (Cal. App. 4th 
2006) (concluding that a state statute that required sealing of financial records in divorce proceedings 
was unconstitutional); Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 
FED. CTS. L. REV. 177, 177–80 (2009) (surveying decisions that have found blanket sealing orders and 
policies unconstitutional); cf. Associated Press v. New Hampshire, 153 N.H. 120, 132–37 (2005) (find- 
ing a statute that presumptively sealed financial affidavits filed in domestic relations cases unconstitu- 
tional under the state constitution); Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash.2d 205, 207 
(1993) (holding that a statute that automatically sealed court records of minor victims of sexual assault 
violated the state constitution). 
343. 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 808. 
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burden on the First Amendment right of public access to court rec- 
ords.344 
This is not to say that courts cannot restrict public access to specific 
types of information or records in their files. Indeed, the exclusion of 
personal identifiers, financial account information, and highly sensitive 
medical information is quite common and is often fully justified.345 Fur- 
thermore, courts are free to exclude from public access records that are 
not subject to a First Amendment right of access in the first place. Recall 
that the public’s right of access does not extend to unfiled discovery ma- 
terial or to other records that are not material to a court’s exercise of its 
adjudicatory functions in a particular case.346 
But, when a First Amendment right of access does reach the records 
in question, the court must consider the specific facts of the case to assess 
whether the interest in privacy is compelling. The imposition of per se 
exclusions in statutes and court rules, by definition and intention, force 
judges to ignore the facts of individual cases. Yet, as the Supreme Court 
warned in Globe Newspaper, “the circumstances of the particular case 
may affect the significance of the interest.”347 Because categorical re- 
strictions on public access foreclose this inquiry, they do not comport 
with the First Amendment. Moreover, when the restrictions on public 
access to court records originate in legislative mandates, they raise po- 
tential separation of powers issues for the courts.348 Were this not the 
case, a legislature could freely decide for itself the scope of the public’s 
right of access to the courts. 
The case-by-case consideration of the interests supporting closure 
and sealing is one of the key benefits of a right of access grounded in the 
First Amendment. In some cases, restrictions on public access will turn 
out to be justified, but in others, the interests supporting closure will not 
 
344. Id. at 808; accord In re Marriage of Nicholas, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“Since the First Amendment guarantee of public access to the courts is at stake, family law depart- 
ments may close their courtrooms and seal their court records only in limited circumstances, and only 
when they expressly identify the particular facts that support the existence of . . . constitutional stand- 
ards.”); Barron v. Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So.2d 113, 119 (Fla. 1988) (finding that medical 
reports regarding a party’s physical condition were an integral part of the case and, thus, should not 
have been sealed in the divorce proceeding); Ex parte Weston, No. 91-DR-23-881, 1991 WL 322233, at 
*10 (S.C. Fam. Ct. Nov. 25, 1991) (“[T]he files of the Family Court should not be subject to special 
shielding. The law of access to judicial records and proceedings, set forth above, must apply to this 
Court as it does to others.”). 
345. Of course, this depends on the specific facts of the case. See supra Subsection IV.B.2. 
346. See supra notes 261–65 and accompanying text. 
347.  457 U.S. at 608. 
348. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983) (reject- 
ing the proposition that FOIA should govern which court records can be sealed); Johnson v. Florida, 
336 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla. 1976) (holding a statute that required judicial records be expunged was unconsti- 
tutional to the extent that it established a procedure for the courts); Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617, 
624 (Ky. 1978) (holding that judicial records were “inseparable from the judicial function itself, and 
are not subject to statutory regulation”); Martin, supra note 11, at 862 n.29. As a consequence, court 
records are exempt from FOIA and most state public-record statutes; when such laws do seem to 
reach court records, courts try to construe them so as to avoid intrusion on judicial authority. See, e.g., 
Rules Comm. of Superior Court v. Freedom of Info. Comm., 472 A.2d 9, 12 (Conn. 1984); Gomez- 
Velez, supra note 282, at 427 n.188. 
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be compelling or there will be a less-restrictive alternative to closure 
available. Under the First Amendment, courts have an obligation to con- 
sider all reasonable alternatives to restricting public access and to choose 
the least speech-restrictive option. That task cannot be delegated to the 
legislature or even to rule-making bodies within the court system. 
The conclusion that per se exclusions on public access are impermis- 
sible under the First Amendment will strike some readers as impractical 
and profoundly out of step with current thinking about the privacy harms 
that accompany the public disclosure of certain types of sensitive infor- 
mation, particularly social security numbers and financial account infor- 
mation that can lead to identity theft. The answer to these concerns, 
however, is not to create exceptions to the First Amendment’s require- 
ment that restrictions on access must be narrowly tailored and supported 
by case-specific findings. Any such “watering down” of the strict scrutiny 
test will undoubtedly bleed over into other areas of First Amendment 
law, especially in the lower courts. As Ashutosh Bhagwat warns, “even if 
one supports outcomes upholding privacy laws against First Amendment 
challenges, one might pause before advocating the position that privacy 
laws—which certainly protect important interests, but hardly ones fun- 
damental to national well-being or social stability—satisfy the tradition- 
ally extremely speech-protective strict scrutiny standard.”349 The better 
approach, as discussed in Part V, is to require that courts continue to en- 
gage in case-specific analysis of the competing interests and develop rules 
that keep highly sensitive information out of a court’s files in the first 
place.350 
 
C. Limits on the Means of Access 
We now turn to the practicalities of public access. Obviously, the 
First Amendment does not require instantaneous access to court records. 
Court administrators must be given some leeway in designing access pol- 
icies and procedures that account for the practical realities of public ac- 
cess. This Section will consider what the First Amendment requires with 
regard to how the courts must provide public access to their records. 
 
1. Access at the Courthouse 
Nearly all courts provide in-person access to court records at their 
respective courthouses. Admittance to the building is therefore typically 
a precondition for accessing court records, and “[w]hether a record- 
seeker needs to show identification, pass through a metal detector, or 
sign in to access records depends entirely on the particular court she is 
visiting.”351 Most courts provide access to the original versions of court 
 
 
349. Bhagwat, supra note 215, at 873–74. 
350. See infra Section V.A. 
351. Conley et al., supra note 2, at 789. 
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records and other filed materials,352 which can be inspected at the court- 
house but cannot be removed from the building. Courts that utilize elec- 
tronic filing systems usually provide access to the records through a com- 
puter terminal or kiosk in the clerk’s office.353 Whether the court is part 
of the federal or state court system, or is a trial, appellate, or supreme 
court, it ordinarily maintains records only for its own cases. Accordingly, 
the times when records can be inspected, the time it takes to receive rec- 
ords, the number of records a requester can review at a time, and wheth- 
er the records can be copied or otherwise duplicated (and any fees for 
doing so) will depend on the policies of the particular court.354 
These practicalities of physical access inevitably impose some bur- 
dens on the public when accessing court records. There appears to be lit- 
tle reason to doubt, however, that reasonable requirements imposed on 
requesters that are unrelated to the content of the records are acceptable 
under the First Amendment. In Globe Newspaper, for example, the Su- 
preme Court remarked in a footnote that “limitations on the right of ac- 
cess that resemble ‘time, place, and manner’ restrictions on protected 
speech . . . would not be subjected to . . . strict scrutiny.”355 Deference un- 
der the “time, place, and manner test” is generally appropriate when the 
restriction serves an important (or significant) governmental interest; the 
interest is unrelated to the content of the information to be disclosed; 
there are no less restrictive alternatives; and there are ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.356 In the context of ac- 
cess to court proceedings, courts have applied this test to restrictions on 
the number of spectators allowed in the courtroom, the use of cameras 
and recording devices, and controls on other courtroom distractions, 
finding such restrictions permissible “in many instances . . . based on the 
legitimate societal interest in protecting the adjudicatory process from 
disruption.”357 
 
 
352. Access to nondocumentary evidence can sometimes involve special restrictions. See Nixon v. 
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (holding that, because the public had been able to 
listen to the tapes, they had no right to physical access to the records as long as the transcripts were 
made available); State v. Archuleta, 857 P.2d 234, 242 (Utah 1993) (holding that “no right exists for 
the public to physically inspect tangible items of evidence admitted at a preliminary hearing unless the 
court, in its discretion, deems it appropriate to allow inspection”). But see United States v. Criden, 648 
F.2d 814, 815 (3d Cir. 1981) (allowing news media to copy audio and video tapes entered into evidence 
and played in open court); United States v. Hernandez, 124 F. Supp. 2d 698, 706 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (or- 
dering, on First Amendment grounds, that the public have access to trial evidence, including “all non- 
documentary evidence for the limited purpose of viewing, photographing, and/or videotaping”). 
353. See Hulse, supra note 76, at 17. 
354. See, e.g., COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 5.00 (b) (“Court 
records will be available for public access in the courthouse during hours established by the court.”). 
355. 457 U.S. 596, 607 n.17 (1982); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 
581 n.18 (1980) (“[A] trial judge, in the interest of the fair administration of justice, [may] impose rea- 
sonable limitations on access to a trial.”) (plurality opinion). 
356. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Brown & Williamson To- 
bacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 
377 (1968)). 
357. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179; see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 
343 (1970); United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1998); Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421, 433 (4th 
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Although there are far fewer cases addressing administrative re- 
strictions on access to court records, as long as a court does not impose 
different procedures based on the content of the records, the “time, 
place, and manner test” will likely permit the court to impose reasonable 
requirements for access that are tied to the court’s administrative 
needs.358 Of course, a court must still justify any administrative burdens, 
and it cannot impose requirements that effectively deny public access to 
its records.359 
 
2. Online Access 
Now we begin to chart new ground in the debate over public access 
to court records. When courts consider providing online access to their 
records, they face several important questions. Does the First Amend- 
ment require online access? If a court does provide online access to some 
of its records, must it provide online access to all of its records? Can a 
court impose restrictions on access to electronic records that would be 
impermissible if applied to physical records? 
The cases do not definitively answer these questions, but the weight 
of authority seems to support the conclusion that the First Amendment 
does not require courts to provide online access to their records. As long 
as they provide some means of public access,360 courts are free to decide 
whether to provide online access, and they may choose to make some, or 
all, of their records available online. If, however, a court does provide 
online access to its records, it will face First Amendment constraints with 
regard to how that access is provided. 
 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 1983); Freitas v. Admin. Dir., 92 
P.3d 993, 999 (Haw. 2004); Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 168–69 (Ind. 1997). 
358. The Sixth Circuit, for example, held in Barth v. City of Macedonia that the First Amendment 
does not require “contemporaneous and immediate access to court records,” and concluded “the city’s 
practice of delaying file requests for twenty four hours is a content neutral restriction because it re- 
stricts all speech regardless of content.” No. 98-3700, 1999 WL 427024, at *1 (6th Cir. June 15, 1999). 
Not all courts are in agreement, however, that court-imposed delays on public access to court records 
are entitled to the highly deferential time, place, and manner test. See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv. v. 
Planet, No. CV1108083SJOFFMX, 2016 WL 4157210, at *13 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2016) (holding that 
“the press and public have a qualified right of timely—but not “same-day”—access to newly filed 
complaints”); Courthouse News Serv. v. Jackson, No. CIV A H-09-1844, 2009 WL 2163609, at *4 (S.D. 
Tex. July 20, 2009) (rejecting application of time, place, and manner test and concluding “that the 24 to 
72 hour delay in access is effectively an access denial and is, therefore, unconstitutional”). 
359. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 
1994) (“In light of the values which the presumption of access [to court records] endeavors to pro- 
mote, a necessary corollary to the presumption is that once found to be appropriate, access should be 
immediate and contemporaneous.”); Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 2016 WL 4157210, at *17 (find- 
ing that the Ventura County Superior Court had not met its burden of proving that delays brought on 
by its processing of newly filed complaints prior to making them available to the public “is the result of 
‘overriding [governmental] interest’ or that such delays are ‘essential to preserve higher values’”) 
(quoting Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 793 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
360. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (noting that the government may 
impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided “they leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information”) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. 7 at 
791); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (holding that, because the public had 
been able to listen to tape recordings played in court, they had no right to physical access to the tapes 
as long as the transcripts were made available). 
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As a starting point, it should be noted that none of the Supreme 
Court’s access cases involved online access to court records. Although 
the Court has repeatedly held that the public has a First Amendment 
right of access to criminal trials and pre-trial proceedings, and while low- 
er courts have extended that right to civil proceedings and court rec- 
ords,361 the courts appear to be agnostic as to how public access is actually 
provided. As described in the previous Section, judges have generally 
been allowed to decide for themselves how to manage access.362 From the 
layouts of their courtrooms and clerks’ offices, to the number of specta- 
tors and visitors they permit to enter their courthouses, the practicalities 
of public access have been largely left to individual judges and court ad- 
ministrators. 
As a result, the courts have taken it upon themselves to decide 
whether—and, if so, to what extent—the public should have online ac- 
cess to their records. Although all of the federal courts and most state 
courts provide some form of online access to their court records, all of 
the courts that provide online access exclude some records from their 
remote access systems that are otherwise available in-person at the 
courthouse.363 For example, in Colorado, the state’s court-records policy 
states that certain information in electronic court records “is not accessi- 
ble to the public due to the inability to protect confidential information,” 
although “[i]t may be available in paper form at local courthouses.”364 
The list includes “financial files;” “[p]robate cases;” “[a]ddresses, phone 
numbers and other contact information for parties;” “[i]nformation re- 
lated to victims of crime;” “[i]nformation related to witnesses;” and 
“[i]nformation related to impartial parties.”365 Similarly, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit remote access to records in actions for 
benefits under the Social Security Act and in certain immigration cases.366 
Because the First Amendment does not require that the public be 
granted online access to court records, courts retain discretion to limit 
which records are available through their online access systems. If a court 
does provide online access to some or all of its court records, however, it 
cannot impose restrictions on who may access those records or how the 
information can be used unless those restrictions comply with the First 
Amendment. Recall that, pursuant to the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, the government cannot grant a benefit on the condition that the 
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may 
withhold that benefit altogether.367 
 
361. See supra Part III. 
362. See supra notes 350–58 and accompanying text. 
363. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(c) (prohibiting remote access to records in actions for benefits 
under the Social Security Act and in certain immigration cases); COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC 
ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.20(b) (listing eight types of information not available via remote ac- 
cess). 
364. COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.20(b). 
365. Id. 
366. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(c). 
367. See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text. 
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V. A NEW PARADIGM  FOR RECONCILING COURT ACCESS AND 
PRIVACY 
Existing approaches to resolving conflicts between court access and 
privacy often operate with the assumption that the two interests are ir- 
reconcilable. The belief that we have to choose between the right to ob- 
serve the work of the courts and the right to privacy, however, is too 
simplistic and has led to shortsighted solutions for resolving conflicts be- 
tween these important values. 
This Part offers some preliminary thoughts on how we can move 
beyond this “zero-sum” thinking. Although it is not possible to eliminate 
all private information in court records, courts can substantially reduce 
the amount of sensitive information that ends up in their files in the first 
place. Courts can also design and manage their online access systems to 
reduce privacy risks and can take on a much more active role in studying 
the extent of sensitive information in their files, as well as how the infor- 
mation in their records is accessed and used. 
 
A. Infusing Privacy Principles into the Litigation Process 
As an initial matter, we must discard the notion that the protection 
of privacy is exclusively the job of judges and court staff. Ensuring that 
privacy interests are protected should be the shared responsibility of all 
participants in the legal system. The current approach to privacy and 
court records can best be described as “dump it all in and let the courts 
sort it out.” As discussed below, litigants and their lawyers too often file 
every document that seems even remotely relevant to their case, relying 
on the court to seal or redact the most sensitive and damaging infor- 
mation. Understaffed and overworked courts, however, do not have the 
resources to parse the millions of documents that are filed every year. 
The courts must substantially reduce the amount of privacy-harming 
information that ends up in their records, much of which is unnecessary 
to the adjudication of the parties’ claims. Court records contain an aston- 
ishing amount of sensitive information that belies any concern about pri- 
vacy on the part of the lawyers involved. What follows are just a few ex- 
amples, but they show the scope of the problem. In the study of North 
Carolina Supreme Court files that I conducted with Anne Klinefelter in 
2014, we found thousands of incidences of sensitive information in the 
briefs and appendices filed with the court.368 In one case, for example, the 
State’s brief described the abduction and rape of a ten-year-old girl, nam- 
ing the child in full on the first page and continuing to identify her by 
name on nearly every subsequent page of the brief.369 In another case, the 
petition for discretionary review included an appendix with the plaintiff’s 
 
368. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1, at 1857–61 (finding that the records contained an av- 
erage of 113 appearances of sensitive information per document). 
369. Brief for the State, filed in State v. Bright, 505 S.E.2d 317 (N.C. App.), review allowed, 525 
S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1998) (also submitted in full to the North Carolina Supreme Court). 
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voluminous medical file, which contained highly sensitive medical infor- 
mation along with multiple references to his social security number, date 
of birth, and home address.370 
Studies of federal court records reveal the same tendency. In 2008, 
Carl Malamud studied a large set of records from the federal PACER 
system and found 1,669 documents with social security numbers and oth- 
er sensitive information.371 In a letter to the Chair of the Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Malamud described a few of the “hor- 
ror stories” he encountered in the records: 
• In the District of Massachusetts, a 54-page list filed in June 2008 
contain[ed] the names, birth dates, [s]ocial [s]ecurity numbers, 
and medical problems of 353 patients of a doctor.372 
• In the District of the District of Columbia, an attorney who was 
not paid in what he considered to be a timely fashion by the Dis- 
trict of Columbia schools decided to raise his rate to $405/hour 
and bill the schools for the difference. To support his claim, he 
listed page after page of the names, home addresses, birth dates, 
and psychological issues for countless minors he saw.373 
• In the Central District of Illinois, pension funds representing la- 
bor unions frequently attach the unredacted list of all union 
members and their Social Security numbers.374 
More recently, in a 2016 case filed by the U.S. Soccer Federation 
against the union for the U.S. Women’s National Team, the complaint 
attached supporting documents that contained detailed personal infor- 
mation about many of the players—including the home addresses and 
personal email accounts of some of soccer’s most prominent players.375 
After the players complained, the U.S. Soccer Federation replaced the 
filing with a redacted version.376 
No doubt, lawyers have a variety of reasons for including private 
and highly sensitive information in court filings. Some parties even ex- 
ploit the current system by intentionally putting such information into 
the public record to cause harm and embarrassment to the other side.377 
Others may simply not appreciate the privacy interests at stake. Given 
the explosion of privacy scholarship, one might assume that everyone 
 
370. Notice of Appeal and Petition for Discretionary Review, filed in Dean v. Cone Mills Corp., 
322 S.E.2d 771 (N.C. 1984). 
371. See Letter from Carl Malamud to The Honorable Lee Rosenthal, Chair, Comm. on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Oct. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Malamud Letter 
to the Honorable Lee Rosenthal], https://public.resource.org/scribd/7512583.pdf (examining 2,706,431 
PDF records). 
372. Id. at 2. 
373. Id. 
374. Id. 
375. See Sam Borden & Andrew Das, U.S. Soccer Lawsuit Disclosed Players’ Personal Infor- 
mation, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2016, at B11. 
376. Id. 
377. See, e.g., 35A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE § 479 (2017) (describ- 
ing procedures for striking scandalous matters from pleadings). 
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thinks deeply about privacy, but this is clearly not the case. Recent stud- 
ies show that most people, including lawyers, have only a fuzzy under- 
standing of privacy.378 
There are a number of options available that would force the parties 
and their lawyers to limit the amount of sensitive information they put in 
court records. First, judges can, as described below, promulgate lists of 
records and information types that should not be included in court filings 
and impose sanctions on parties who file records that contain restricted 
information without the court’s permission. Second, the protection of 
privacy could be made a part of the ethical and legal obligations a lawyer 
has to her clients and to the court.379 Third, at least with regard to repre- 
sented parties, clients could bring malpractice claims against their attor- 
neys for failing to comply with reasonable privacy practices.380 Fourth, 
courts could feature prominent reminders of the privacy risks associated 
with court filings and design the user interfaces of their electronic filing 
systems to reinforce the need to refrain from filing unnecessary personal 
information.381 
In fact, state and federal courts have already begun to shift the bur- 
den of protecting private and sensitive information in court records to 
the lawyers and parties, as have a number of state courts.382 Rule 5.2 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, requires the redaction 
of certain personal information in federal filings, both paper and elec- 
tronic.383 A growing number of states have adopted similar require- 
ments.384 One of the leading states is Florida, which has implemented a 
 
378. See Asimina Vasalou et al., Privacy as a Fuzzy Concept: A New Conceptualization of Privacy 
For Practitioners, 66 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 918, 920 (2015); PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY 
AND SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www. 
pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/. 
379. Attorneys are already bound by principles of confidentiality with regard to client infor- 
mation, which is reflected in the legal ethics rules of every state and in the American Bar Association’s 
Model Rule 1.6. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N) (Discussion Draft 
1983). Similar rules could cover the filing of certain categories of highly sensitive information in court 
filings. 
380. See Michael Caughey, Comment, Keeping Attorneys from Trashing Identities: Malpractice as 
Backstop Protection for Clients Under  the  United  States  Judicial  Conference’s  Policy  on  Electronic  
Court Records, 79 WASH. L. REV. 407, 407 (2004) (“To recover their losses from identity theft, clients 
might seek recovery from the attorneys who caused their losses by failing to redact their personal in- 
formation from court filings.”). 
381. The impact of “user interface design” choices on privacy has been studied extensively. See, 
e.g., Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and 
Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1333, 1365–77 (2013). 
382. Conley et al., supra note 2, at 782. 
383. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2. Rule 5.2 states in relevant part: 
Unless the court orders otherwise, in an electronic or paper filing with the court . . . a party or 
nonparty making the filing may include only: 
the last four digits of the social-security number and taxpayer-identification number; 
the year of the individual’s birth; 
the minor’s initials; and 
the last four digits of the financial-account number. 
384. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:38-7(a) (2009) (requiring parties to redact “confidential personal iden- 
tifiers,” including social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, vehicle plate numbers, insurance 
policy numbers, active financial account numbers, and active credit card numbers); N.C. EFILING 
RULE 6.3; 204 PA. CODE § 213.7(a) (2015) (requiring parties and their attorneys “to refrain from in- 
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strategy to “curtail, or minimize, the inclusion of personal information in 
court files that is unnecessary for purposes of adjudication and case man- 
agement.”385 The resulting court rules were the product of extensive re- 
search and recommendations from a Study Committee on Privacy and 
Court Records.386 The committee urged the Florida Supreme Court to 
“address[] the inclusion and dissemination of personal information in 
court records at the source . . . .”387 In focusing on the role of the lawyers, 
the committee acknowledged that the changes it recommended repre- 
sented “a fundamental shift in the posture of courts in Florida regarding 
the very acceptance of filings” by moving from an “open” filing model to 
a “controlled” model.388 
Policies and rules that limit the filing of unnecessary private or sen- 
sitive information in court files, a strategy known as “minimization,”389 
should be expanded, and courts should be aggressive in sanctioning par- 
ties and their lawyers for violations. Indeed, there are a number of in- 
formation types, such as social security numbers and financial account 
numbers, that we know have both a high potential for harm and are un- 
likely to be relevant in the vast majority of cases. In the rare instance 
when parties believe there is a legitimate need for such information to be 
included in the court file, they can seek the court’s permission to do so. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Cox v. Cohn, keeping information out of 
court records in the first place is not only preferable to sealing the rec- 
ords, but it also avoids First Amendment concerns entirely.390 
Moreover, if courts do not substantially reduce the amount of pri- 
vate and sensitive information in their files, they will become less appeal- 
ing as a way to resolve disputes. Indeed, we are already seeing privacy 
concerns drive an increase in the use of alternative dispute resolution 
(“ADR”) procedures, particularly confidential arbitrations where no 
public right of access exists at all.391 Potential litigants who cannot afford 
 
 
 
 
cluding social security numbers and financial information in all documents and exhibits filed with the 
court”); In re Implementation of Comm. on Privacy & Court Records Recommendations, 78 So.3d 
1045, 1049 (Fla. 2011) (identifying “categories of personal information that must not be filed or must 
be truncated or redacted before filing”). 
385. COMM. ON PRIVACY & COURT RECORDS, SUPREME COURT OF FLA., PRIVACY, ACCESS, AND 
COURT RECORDS 23 (2005) [hereinafter FL. COMM. ON PRIVACY & COURT RECORDS]. 
386. See D. R. Jones, Protecting the Treasure: An Assessment of State Court Rules and Policies for 
Access to Online Civil Court Records, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 375, 415–19 (2013) (describing the work of 
the committee and its recommendations). 
387.   Id. at 419. 
388. FL. COMM. ON PRIVACY & COURT RECORDS, supra note 385, at 25–26. 
389. Id. at 23. 
390. 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (“If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceed- 
ings, the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private 
information. . . . Once true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspec- 
tion, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.”). 
391. See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time  to  Let  Some  Sun  
Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 481–82 (2006). 
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ADR may simply view the privacy costs as too great and decide not to 
seek resolution in the courts—or worse, engage in self-help remedies.392 
 
B. Managing Online Access to Reduce Privacy Risks 
As discussed above, the First Amendment does not require that 
courts provide online access to their records.393 Nevertheless, all of the 
federal courts and most state courts provide online access to at least 
some of their court records. Although the First Amendment does con- 
strain courts’ ability to restrict who may access online records and how 
the information in them may be used, courts retain considerable discre- 
tion in how they provide online access to their records. 
In setting up and administering online access, courts can address po- 
tential privacy concerns in at least two ways. First, because the First 
Amendment does not mandate online access, courts can choose to make 
only some of their records available online. They can, for example, de- 
cide not to allow online access to records associated with highly sensitive 
cases, such as juvenile and family court proceedings, or to specific types 
of records, such as psychological evaluations and presentence reports. 
Courts can also redact sensitive information such as social security num- 
bers and financial account information from documents they make avail- 
able online. As long as they provide access to the complete versions of 
these records at the courthouse or elsewhere,394 courts can choose which 
records and information to make available online. 
Second, courts can design and manage their online access systems in 
ways that enhance privacy. The design and architecture of online access 
systems can have a significant impact on how accessible the information 
in court records actually is. Choices regarding search interfaces, indexing, 
links to other data sources, and bulk downloading not only impact the 
accessibility of information in court records,395 they also potentially shape 
the uses of the records. In other words, courts can design and manage 
their online access systems to impose various levels of practical obscurity 
on the information in court records. As Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic 
Stutzman note, online obscurity can provide a “useful middle-ground 
protection” for sensitive and private information: 
By embracing obscurity, courts and lawmakers can avoid the com- 
plete opacity created by traditional privacy protections, such as 
sealed records. At the same time, courts and lawmakers should pro- 
392. See Karen Eltis, The Judicial System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship between 
Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber Context, 56 MCGILL L.J. 289, 301–02 (2011) (suggesting that 
privacy concerns are “deterring participation in the justice system”) (emphasis omitted); Winn, supra 
note 11, at 315 (“Instead of increasing social respect for the judicial system, unrestricted access to 
court records will undermine the respect and confidence the courts in this country have traditionally 
enjoyed.”). 
393. See supra Subsection IV.C.2. 
394. For courts that have switched to electronic filing, “courthouse only” access policies typically 
entail the use of computer kiosks at the courthouse to provide access to electronic records. See Hulse, 
supra note 76, at 17. 
395. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 824. 
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vide obscurity in situations where they are not willing to provide to- 
tal secrecy or confidentiality. Hence, obscurity could protect certain 
privacy interests while also promoting the dissemination of infor- 
mation.396 
The question, then, is how to design online access systems that max- 
imize the values of both public access and privacy. Of course, no system 
of access can provide perfectly frictionless access to court records. Design 
decisions impact accessibility and inevitably involve tradeoffs. For exam- 
ple, all of the systems in use today require users to register first (some- 
times with a fee) and allow access to the records only through the court’s 
proprietary user interface. These user interfaces can vary substantially in 
the functionality they offer to users to locate and view records. For ex- 
ample, PACER’s interface does not allow searches based on party name 
and location. Therefore, searching for cases involving John Smith, or an- 
other common surname, will often return hundreds of hits. Many courts 
have also decided not to allow Google to index their electronic records 
because Google’s search capabilities are considered to be “too good.”397 
A number of courts also do not allow for bulk downloads through their 
online access systems.398 
Courts can also design their online records systems in ways that en- 
courage lawyers and litigants to engage in good privacy practices. For ex- 
ample, the user interface for court-record filers could include prominent 
reminders of the need to keep certain information and records out of 
court files. The system could also automatically scan materials prior to 
filing in order to identify potentially problematic records and infor- 
mation. Highly patterned information such as social security numbers 
(“123-12-1234”) and bank statements are relatively easy to find with ex- 
isting search tools,399 and newer statistical approaches that rely on ma- 
chine learning systems are expanding the range of information types that 
can be found through automated searches.400 At the completion of these 
scans, filers can be notified of the need to either redact the information 
or seek permission to include the information in the filing. 
Courts need to understand that, by providing online access to their 
records, their role changes from “custodians” of the records to “publish- 
ers.”401 In taking on this new role, courts should carefully consider what 
information they wish to make available online and how the loss of prac- 
tical obscurity impacts privacy. Just because information is  publicly 
 
396. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 44. 
397. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 812. 
398. See supra note 175. 
399. See Lynn E. Sudbeck, Placing Court Records Online: Balancing Judicial Accountability with 
Public Trust and Confidence: An Analysis of State Court Electronic Access Policies and a Proposal for 
South Dakota Court Records, 51 S.D. L. Rᴇᴠ. 81, 94–96 (2006). 
400. See, e.g., Liqiang Geng et al., Using Data Mining Methods to Predict Personally Identifiable 
Information  in  Emails, in  ADVANCED DATA MINING AND APPLICATIONS 272 (2008). 
401. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE  WORKING  GRP.  ON  PROTECTIVE  ORDERS, 
CONFIDENTIALITY & PUB. ACCESS, The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practices Addressing  Protective  Or- 
ders, Confidentiality & Public Access in Civil Cases 57–58 (2007). 
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available at the courthouse does not mean it must be available without 
limitation through the court’s website. Courts must move beyond the bi- 
nary conception of privacy that sees information as either public or pri- 
vate.402 As Daniel Solove suggests, “privacy must be understood as an 
expectation of a limit on the degree of accessibility of information.”403 
Courts should be careful, however, not to foreclose the benefits that 
come from allowing remote access to court records. It is tempting to 
think that court records are relevant to only the courtroom participants, 
but this is not the case. Many of our most controversial legal, social, and 
political issues are debated in the courts. The issues that are played out in 
the courts—even in apparently mundane cases—as well as the manner in 
which these cases are addressed and resolved by the courts are of pro- 
found public concern.404 Moreover, court records are full of information 
on every conceivable issue, from DNA sequencing to the safety of auto- 
mobile ignition switches.405 As Lynn LoPucki has noted, “the courts are 
among the most information-rich institutions in society.”406 
The fact is, without online access to court records, the benefits of 
public access will be reduced. Curtailing remote access to court records, 
for example, would reduce the frequency and quality of media reporting 
about the courts.407 It would limit the ability of litigants and their lawyers 
to assess their likelihood of success in litigation.408 It would limit the abil- 
ity of historians to make sense of important legal and social move- 
ments.409 It would limit the work of social scientists.410 And it would di- 
minish the accountability of the court system as whole.411 
 
402. See supra notes 39–48 and accompanying text. 
403. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1141. 
404. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 899–901. 
405. See id. at 898. 
406. LoPucki, supra note 11, at 510. 
407. See Brooke Barnett, Note, Use of Public Records Databases in Newspaper and Television 
Newsrooms, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 557, 558 (2001) (“If legislatures restrict [online access to public rec- 
ords], not only would some stories prove more difficult or expensive to report, or be reported less 
completely, accurately, or quickly, but reporters would miss altogether those stories that result from 
routine searching of public records—so-called ‘enterprise stories.’”). Lucy Dalglish, former executive 
director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, highlighted the important role that 
court records play for the media in testimony before the Privacy Subcommittee of the Judicial Confer- 
ence Standing Committee on the Federal Rules: 
We are in a situation where there are a lot fewer journalists in mainstream news organizations. By 
having easy access to this information, they are able to do a better job of reporting the news to 
the public. There are some jurisdictions—probably not Manhattan, but certainly in places like 
Utah—where you have many local newspapers and really only one federal court that covers an 
enormous geographic area. Now they are able to accurately and completely report news stories as 
well. 
Symposium, Panel One: General Discussion on Privacy and Public Access to Court Files, 79 FORDHAM   
L. REV. 1, 13 (2010). 
408. See Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big Data, 67 FLA. L. 
REV. 1337, 1355 (2015). 
409. See Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching, and 
Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 161–62 (2006). 
410. See David Robinson et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
160, 167 (2009). 
411. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 839; LoPucki, supra note 11, at 533; 
Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 409, at 168; Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 408, at 1353. 
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Furthermore, restrictions on electronic access to court records will 
negatively impact legal scholarship. Scholars tend to focus their work on 
appellate court opinions in part because they are easy to access. The le- 
gal realists pointed out this problem decades ago, but only recently have 
scholars been able to delve deeply into the raw materials that underlie 
the work of trial courts.412 As the noted legal realist Karl Llewellyn ex- 
plained: 
I am a prey, as is every man who tries to work with law, to the ap- 
perceptive mass. . . . What records have I of the work of [trial court] 
magistrates? How shall I get them? Are there any? And if there 
are, must I search them out myself? But the appellate courts make 
access to their work convenient. They issue reports, printed, bound, 
to be had all gathered for me in libraries. The convenient source of 
information lures.413 
This is not to say that courts should always maximize public accessi- 
bility when implementing online court-records systems. Rather, it is to 
point out that when they evaluate the tradeoffs of various design choices, 
they should consider the impact on both privacy and public access. 
 
C. Identifying Where Privacy Harms Are Greatest 
A growing body of research shows that online access to government 
records can create substantially greater harms to privacy than existed in 
the past.414 Although few, if any, of these harms are new, they are ex- 
panding and evolving in ways we have not anticipated and therefore have 
not been able to effectively prevent. 
At the same time, while we may intuitively feel that some infor- 
mation simply should not be shared with the public, courts must translate 
that feeling into an articulable, concrete harm in order to justify re- 
strictions on public access to court records.415 The change from paper- 
based court-record systems to electronic systems will undoubtedly impact 
how courts evaluate privacy risks and harms. Although, as Peter Winn 
warns, “[i]t is temptingly easy to assume that if one applies the same set 
of rules to electronic judicial records that was applied in the past to paper 
records, it will result in the same balance between the various competing 
policies,”416 this is clearly not the case. 
Online access will likely make the protection of some privacy inter- 
ests compelling in situations when they may not have been in the past. 
 
412. See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and  Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L.  
REV. 681, 683–85 (2007) (describing the benefits of conducting empirical research about district courts 
using court records). 
413. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 90 (1960). 
414. See generally, e.g., Conley et al., supra note 2; Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3; Solove, 
Access and Aggregation, supra note 8. 
415. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity  Versus  Liberty, 
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1220 (2004) (“We cannot simply start by asking ourselves whether privacy viola- 
tions are intuitively horrible or nightmarish. The job is harder than that.”). 
416. Winn, supra note 11, at 315. 
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For example, the disclosure of certain types of information that previous- 
ly appeared to be innocuous, such as social security numbers, can be- 
come problematic when the information is combined with other publicly 
available information, such as birth and property records.417 As Daniel 
Solove notes: “[e]ven information in public records that is superficial or 
incomplete can be quite useful in obtaining more data about individuals. 
Information breeds information.”418 Indeed, data brokers have built their 
businesses on linking disparate pieces of information together, and their 
ability to compile detailed profiles on individuals can exacerbate privacy 
risks.419 
Scholars have long argued that court records raise substantial priva- 
cy concerns, but we have lacked empirical studies about the extent and 
context of the information in court records and the harms that can arise 
from their disclosure. Such studies are essential to understanding the 
threats to privacy that court records present. Any reasoned approach to 
addressing privacy must include an assessment of risk. Although some 
work is being done with regard to these issues,420 we are only beginning to 
develop a sufficient body of research that examines the potential loss of 
privacy when court records are made available through online systems 
compared with longstanding public access at the courthouse that was 
practically obscure due to logistical barriers to access. 
Because of the lack of empirical studies, courts have tended to focus 
their privacy efforts on the most obvious categories of sensitive infor- 
mation and privacy harms, such as personal identification numbers and 
bank account information that can lead to identity theft and financial 
fraud.421 Concerns about privacy, however, extend far beyond the limited 
list of information types and records identified in existing court rules.422 
Although privacy scholars continue to debate how far privacy protec- 
tions should extend, groundbreaking work by scholars such as Danielle 
Citron,423 Julie Cohen,424 and Neil Richards425 are forcing reconsideration 
of the very nature of privacy. Such work has brought important attention 
to the broad range of interests that can be implicated by the disclosure of 
personal information in public records, ranging from abortion infor- 
mation to voting history. How often such information appears in court 
records and how it is being accessed are important questions that courts 
can help us answer. 
 
417. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 782; Marder, supra note 14, at 447. 
418. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1185. 
419. See supra Part II. 
420. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1; Conley et al., supra note 2; Malamud Letter to the 
Honorable Lee Rosenthal, supra note 371; Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8. 
421. See supra notes 333–35. 
422. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1, at 1881–89 (identifying 140 types of sensitive infor- 
mation that can be found in court records). 
423. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009). 
424. See,  e.g.,  JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING  THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND   THE 
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012). 
425. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008). 
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We also lack empirical research on the impact that online access to 
court records has on court transparency and accountability.426 Again, we 
intuitively feel that the benefits of public access are enhanced by online 
access, but we can do better than simply rely on anecdotes. Furthermore, 
research about how court records are used will help us understand why 
we value public access in the first place. As Felix Wu points out, “con- 
ceptions of accountability, a form of utility relevant here, are crucial to 
understanding the balance between privacy and utility with respect to ac- 
cess to court records.”427 
One of the benefits of electronic court-record systems is that the 
courts now have the means to easily collect information about the court 
records the public is accessing. Even the most basic electronic records 
systems can track which records have been accessed, who has accessed 
them, and from what location (online or at a courthouse kiosk). Elec- 
tronic record systems can also provide information about the types of 
cases and records viewed, as well as how many individual records a spe- 
cific user downloaded. This data can provide valuable insight into how 
the information in court records is being used. Moreover, for systems 
that require a credit card for the payment of access fees, such as PACER, 
the courts can also glean a great deal of information about the users 
themselves.428 
Although courts have been very active in convening committees and 
working groups to consider new access policies, they have been far less 
active in supporting research on the extent of private and sensitive in- 
formation in their files and on how their records are accessed and used. 
As courts across the country continue to develop policies and systems for 
online access to court records, it will be critical for them to rely on—and 
support—studies that examine the nature of the privacy harms that can 
arise from online access, as well as the impacts that various design deci- 
sions are likely to have on court transparency. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current framework for dealing with sensitive information in 
court records is broken. We cannot continue to count on the courts to 
sort through the avalanche of records that lawyers and parties file and 
hope that judges or court staff will catch every appearance of sensitive 
information and either seal the records or redact the harmful infor- 
mation. Our understaffed and overworked court systems simply do not 
have the resources to do this. 
Until recently, we have been able to rely on the obscurity of court 
records to protect privacy interests, but we can no longer do so. As 
 
426. Some important work is being done on this issue. See Barnett, supra note 407; Hoffman, su- 
pra note 412; LoPucki, supra note 11; Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 409. 
427. Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117, 1176 
(2013). 
428. Some of this information raises privacy concerns of its own. 
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courts increasingly embrace electronic filing systems and implement 
online public access, the potential risks to privacy can no longer be dis- 
counted or waved away as the necessary price of court transparency. 
Although online court-record systems have brought substantial benefits 
to the public429—and to the courts themselves430—the loss of practical ob- 
scurity that has accompanied their adoption has ignited a debate about 
the privacy risks that arise from public access to court records. 
Concerns about commercial exploitation of court records and the 
loss of practical obscurity are threatening to push judges and legislators 
to drastically curtail the public’s right of access to the courts. Indeed, a 
number of courts are moving away from the careful balancing of interests 
that have traditionally guided judges in access disputes and instead are 
excluding whole categories of information, documents, and cases from 
public access. This approach, while superficially appealing, is contrary to 
established First Amendment doctrines that mandate a presumption of 
public access and require case-specific analysis before public access can 
be restricted. 
Fortunately, courts have a variety of tools at their disposal to reduce 
the threats to privacy that come from electronic court records. First, be- 
cause the First Amendment does not mandate online access, courts can 
choose to make only some of their records available online. They can, for 
example, decide not to allow online access to records associated with 
highly sensitive cases, such as juvenile and family court proceedings, or 
to specific types of records, such as psychological evaluations and presen- 
tence reports. Courts can also redact sensitive information such as social 
security numbers and financial account information from documents they 
make available online.431 
Second, courts can design and manage their online access systems in 
ways that enhance privacy. Choices regarding search interfaces, indexing, 
and bulk downloading not only impact the accessibility of information in 
court records, they also shape the uses of the records. In other words, 
courts can design and manage their online access systems to impose vari- 
ous levels of practical obscurity on the information in their records. 
Courts should be careful, however, not to foreclose the benefits that 
come from allowing online access to court records. As I have described 
here and in prior work, court transparency is a fundamental tenant of 
American democracy. 
 
429. See supra Part III. 
430. See, e.g., J. DOUGLAS WALKER, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ELECTRONIC COURT 
DOCUMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT AND DATA INTERCHANGE 
TECHNOLOGY 15 (1999) (“With the nearly continuous rise in volume and complexity of the paperwork 
involved in the judicial process . . . technology and electronic communications could offer a better al- 
ternative to the flood of paper forms and documents.”); Jones, supra note 386, at 378 (“Implementa- 
tion of e-filing is rising as courts, faced with limited budgets and lack of space, consider alternatives to 
maintaining print records.”). 
431. As long as they provide access to the complete versions of these records at the courthouse or 
elsewhere, courts can choose which records and information to make available online. See supra Sec- 
tion V.B. 
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Third, and most importantly, we must discard the notion that the 
protection of privacy is exclusively the job of judges and court staff. En- 
suring that privacy interests are protected should be the shared responsi- 
bility of all participants in the legal system. Even a cursory glance at 
court records shows that they contain an astonishing amount of private 
and sensitive information, much of which is irrelevant to the underlying 
claims. Accordingly, we must shift the obligation for protecting privacy 
to lawyers and litigants, who should not be permitted to include private 
and sensitive information in court files if it is not relevant to the adjudi- 
cation of their case. 
